Let me tell you...

Moved to a New Address

Thu, 11 Sep 2008 23:18:48 GMT

I grew a bit tired of LiveJournal and decided to move my blog to a more stable platform. LiveJournal developers managed to produce an interface that combines few useful features with an abundance of bugs. This is a truly remarkable "achievement" for an IT company operating in Russia - the land of quality programming on a budget. And then there is LiveJournal's habit of changing around its interface on a regular basis and for no particular reason. Sort of like the new Microsoft Office...

And so, without further ado, the link to my blog's new location: http://www.venik4.com

Photos: Georgian Losses in the War

Sun, 07 Sep 2008 04:20:05 GMT

During the five-day conflict, the Georgian army has lost dozens of MBTs, APCs, trucks, self-propelled artillery and other vehicles. Georgia also lost most of its Navy and Air Force. Majority of Georgian air defense assets were destroyed. Most of the equipment lost by Georgia was not not destroyed but rather abandoned by the Georgian army during its speedy retreat.

Photos: Destruction of Tskhinvali

Sun, 07 Sep 2008 04:06:14 GMT

According to the UNOSAT report, at least 438 residential buildings in Tskhinvali were destroyed or seriously damaged. South Ossetian authorities estimate the damage to the country's infrastructure at around USD 400 million. Russia allocated USD 500 million to be spent by the end of the year on reconstruction in South Ossetia. Additional funding for South Ossetia will be allocated in 2009 through the federal budget of North Ossetia.

Photos: Victims in South Ossetia

Sun, 07 Sep 2008 02:59:57 GMT

According to the latest reports, more than 1,900 people have been killed in the August 7-12 attack on South Ossetia by the army of Georgia. Russian prosecutors so far have identified the remains of 134 dead residents of South Ossetia in addition to the 59 killed and 104 wounded Russian peacekeepers.

Pentagon-Hired Contractor Trained Georgian Army

Sat, 06 Sep 2008 21:12:32 GMT

In the late 1800s, one American poet wrote: “When I see a bird that walks like a duck and swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, I call that bird a duck.” Since the first day of the war in the Caucasus, people familiar with history started noticing peculiar similarities between Georgia's attack on South Ossetia and the 1995 Operation Storm, when the US-trained Croatian army launched what the UN called the biggest ethnic cleansing operation of the Balkan wars against ethnic Serbs in the Krajina region. In 1995 the Pentagon hired Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) – a US-based mercenary firm - to prepare the Croatian army for the operation in Krajina. General Carl E. Vuono – a US general of Finnish ancestry, the former Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command – was hired by MPRI in 1993 and is believed to have been the key planner behind the Operation Storm. Today Carl Vuono is the president of MPRI.

The Financial Times recently published a report (“US military trained Georgian commandos”, by Charles Clover and Demetri Sevastopulo, FT, Sept. 5, 2008) revealing that some time in 2006 the Pentagon contracted MPRI to provide training to Georgian special forces. According to email obtained by the Financial Times, the US instructors in Georgia were paid $2000 per week plus expenses. The existence of this training program was confirmed by the spokesman for the US European Command. MPRI's involvement in Georgia has been suspected for some time and now it has been officially confirmed by the Pentagon.

The reason Pentagon hires these private contractors is not to save money and not because the US military lacks the necessary expertise or resources. The primary goal here is very simple: should the shit hit the fan – like it did in Georgia – all of it would land on MPRI's doorstep. On August 28 Russia's General Nogovitsin showed journalists a US passport found by Russian troops in South Ossetia. The passport belongs to one Michael Lee White, a US Army veteran from Austin, Texas. Mr. White teaches English at the Guangdong University of Business Studies in southern China. In the interview to the WSJ, White claims to have accidentally left the passport in the seat pocket on a flight from Moscow to New York in 2005. However, in another interview White said that the passport was stolen from him ("Local family, global intrigue", by Martey Toohey, Austin American - Statesman, page B1, Aug. 31, 2008). The Russian authorities say that the passport bears entry and exit stamps for the period after 2005. In particular, White's passport shown by Nogovitsin bears a 2008 entry stamp for Kazakhstan. Officials in Kazakhstan confirmed that White has a valid visa there. The same information was confirmed by the Statesman.

The Wall Street Journal reports (“From Russia Without Love: Kremlin Calls Mr. White a U.S. Agent”, by Gordon Fairclough and Gregory L. White, WSJ, Sept. 3, 2008) that Mr. White's new passport shows that he left China on July 18 and returned on August 28 – the day Gen. Nogovitsin made his announcement. Mr White claims that he was in Texas caring for his elderly father, however, his passport does not show US entry or exit stamps. The Russian government spokesman said that further evidence of US involvement in the Georgian war will be released at a later time.

The WSJ article quotes Milton Bearden, a former CIA operative, as saying that an intelligence agent “with any intelligence” would not carry his passport with him in the field. Perhaps an intelligence agent wouldn't do that, but Mr. White is no James Bond – probably just a former Army grunt hired by the MPRI like so many unqualified personnel employed by MPRI, Blackwater and others in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand, people who know White say he is intelligent and well-educated. White's father is - Philip L. White - is emeritus professor of history at the University of Texas in Austin. White and his father are writing a book "Nationality in World History". So maybe he is not just an Army grunt.

Why carry a US passport in Georgia? Because, should you be captured by the Russians, this passport will make a difference between getting shot in the head and being put on a plane to Moscow and eventually released. See the difference? And, of course, the Russians would not have said a thing if this passport was the only evidence they had. This, along with Putin's CNN interview, was just a teaser designed to make the US more cooperative (or at least less uncooperative) in this critical time for the GOP.

Ukraine's Political Turmoil

Thu, 04 Sep 2008 23:19:17 GMT

The constitutional crisis in Ukraine is a direct result of the threats made by the US and the EU against Russia's WTO membership bid. In case Ukraine's political life is not at the top of your list of interests, here is a very brief summary of events from the past week of Ukraine's turbulent political life.

Yushchenko – Ukraine's pro-Western president – accused Julia Timoshenko – Ukraine's cute, hugely popular pro-Western Prime Minister of treason and launched a formal criminal investigation against his right-hand woman and mother-in-law of Sean Carr of Death Valley Screamers. Yushchenko claims that Timoshenko was in bed with the Kremlin and that Russia was going to support Timoshenko in the upcoming 2010 presidential election. Timoshenko, who is also the leader of the BYT – the second largest faction in the Parliament - sided with the Regions Party (led by the pro-Russian former Prime Minister and presidential candidate Yanukovich) to pass - with overwhelming majority – a legislation stripping the president of some of his most important powers.

Timoshenko also called Yushchenko's rule a “dictatorship of stupidity, irresponsibility and chaos”. Yushchenko threatened to dissolve the Parliament and to call for early parliamentary elections, probably hoping that the anti-Russian hysteria raised in the wake of the war in Georgia will allow his nationalist party to get more seats in the parliament at the expense of Yanukovich's Regions Party. And Timoshenko countered by calling for early presidential elections, which she should have no problem winning due to Yushchenko's extremely low approval ratings. Timoshenko is one of the most ruthless and opportunistic politicians in the history of politics. Yushchenko learned the hard way not to put anything in his Prime Minister's pretty little mouth.

All this Brownian motion in Kiev's political circles was caused by Russia's decision to shelve its WTO membership plans in light of continuing opposition from the US and the European Union. So how does this affect Ukraine, you ask? Russia is by far Ukraine's most important trade partner and its biggest energy supplier. Ukraine imports 90% of its oil and most of its natural gas. Despite sharp political disagreements, yearly trade between Russia and Ukraine has grown from about $9 billion in 2000 to nearly $30 billion in 2007. A quarter of Ukraine's exports is going to Russia.

Ukraine is one of the world's largest producers of cast iron and steel. However, many steel production facilities in Ukraine are owned by Russian businesses. Also, most electricity used by Ukraine's steel mills comes from Russia. Ukraine is a large exporter of coal-derived fuel coke, mineral fertilizers and sulfuric acid. Ukraine is also a major producer of grain, sugar, meat and dairy products. Russia is the biggest foreign consumer of these Ukrainian products. Russia's attempts to join the WTO meant pacifying Ukraine's opposition by offering the country favorable trading status.

Now that Russia is getting ready to put its WTO aspirations on ice for a few years, Ukraine may be hit the hardest. Favorable trading status for Ukraine no longer makes economic sense for Russia, which is now more interested in protecting its own steel, chemical, and agricultural industries. For example, growing food prices in Europe increase viability of Russia's own agricultural industry, making it attractive for investors. Trade with Russia also accounts for most of Ukraine's hi-tech exports, without which the country risks becoming Poland-junior in the European economic hierarchy with no hope of serious growth.

With Ukraine's steel production and coal mining industries behind Yanukovich and the country's energy and agricultural sectors behind Timoshenko, the big business in Ukraine prompted the two largest parliamentary factions – Timoshenko's BYT and Yanukovich's Regions Party – to join forces against the country's embattled president, whose stark anti-Russian rhetoric in the past weeks has irked the Kremlin and threatened Ukraine's growing trade with its largest economic partner. While the West is worrying about Russian tanks taking over the Crimean Peninsula, the likely future of political life in Kiev will be shaped by a different kind of a hostile takeover. Yushchenko's latest troubles are signs of how distant Ukraine's president has become from his country's economic reality.

Photos: Georgian Army Before the War

Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:24:18 GMT

As the Georgian Defense Ministry sacked its Army chief and the Deputy Chief of General Staff, lets take a look at what the Georgian army once was, with the help of some American tax dollars. Watching these ridiculous displays of crispy US-made uniforms and Israeli multiple-launch rocket systems atop shiny Mercedes-Benz trucks, Saakashvili couldn't wait to try out his new toys against his archnemesis - the people of Tskhinvali. His innocent dreams of genocide were rudely crushed by some rusty Russian tanks and his army was demolished by a crop-dusting outfit of old Soviet Su-25s from the potato field just over the mountains.

UPDATE:

Some details on the chain of command of the Georgian Armed Forces:

Minister of Defence:    David Kezerashvili
First Deputy Minister of Defence:    Batu Kutelia
Deputy Minister of Defence:    Mamuka Mujiri
Deputy Minister of Defence:    Vera Dzneladze
Deputy Minister of Defence:    Giorgi Muchaidze
Chief of Joint Staff of the Armed Forces:    Brigadier General Zaza Gogava
Deputy Chiefs of General Staff:    Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Osepaishvili (dismissed, replaced by Gen-Maj Devi Chankotadze, former artillery chief), Lieutenant-Colonel Giga Tatishvili
Commander of the Land Forces:    Lieutenant Colonel Balakhadze Mamia (dismissed, replaced by Maj Merab Agladze)
Commander of the Air Force:    Colonel David Nairshvili
Commander of the Navy:    Captain Besik Shengelia

Detailed biographies of Georgian command staff can be found on the South Ossetian information site OsInform. It is evident that many top Georgian commanders have very limited military background. For example, Lt. Col. Giga Tatishvili, the second Deputy Chief of General Staff was born in 1974, until 1993 studied economics at the University of Tbilisi but did not graduate. In 1997 he received his Bachelor in Business Administration from the University of Antwerp, Belgium. During 1997-1999 worked in Moscow as a manager at the Sbarro International chain of pizza stores. During 1999-2001 Tatishvili worked as a Georgia consultant at the UN. Military-related education of Tatishvili did not begin until 2005 and was limited to a few specialized courses offered at the Joint Special Operations University at Hurlburt Field, FL. So there you have Georgia's second Deputy Chief of General Staff - expert in selling pizza in Moscow.

Human Rights Watch Misidentified Cluster Bomb

Tue, 02 Sep 2008 03:49:11 GMT

Human Rights Watch has published a photo of what it claims to be a Russian RBK-250 cluster bomb found in the Georgian village of Ruisi, near the border with South Ossetia. The caption to the photo published by HRW reads:

"Georgians look at the remains of a bomb dropped by a Russian aircraft on the village of Ruisi, near South Ossetia, Tuesday, August 12, 2008. Human Rights Watch has identified the weapon as a RBK-250 cluster bomb."

Below is the original screenshot from the HRW Web gallery and here is a link to a digitally enlarged image. (If you have a higher resolution version of this photo, please send it to me.)

The moment I saw the photo, it was clear to me that this was not the 7-foot-long RBK-250. Below is a small collection of photos depicting several RBK-250 bombs. Notice the size and shape of the tail section, particularly at the point where the tailcone connects to the tail stabilizers. Also notice the round stabilizer on the tail of the RBK-250. All these characteristic design features are missing on the weapon in the photo published by Human Rights Watch. Take a look at the shape of the tail fins: the fins on the RBK-250 are longer and have a rounded leading corner.

Soviet-/Russian-made RBK-250 cluster bombs

Several types of Russian aviation bombs, including the 7-foot long RBK-250 (first from the right). The photo of a man standing next to a FAB-250 bomb (third from the left in the first photo) should give a sense of scale. As you can see, the RBK-250 bomb is considerably larger than the bomb on the HRW photo.

Cutaway diagram of a Russian RBK-250-275, showing the payload of AO-1SCh bomblets (Source: JEOD, Jane's)

Today someone took care of updating the Wikipedia "Cluster bombs" article with some relevant information about the use of such weapons in Georgia:

"According to Human Rights Watch, the Russian Air Force dropped RBK-250 cluster bombs in populated areas during the war in Georgia, killing at least 11 civilians and injuring dozens: "this is the first known use of cluster munitions since 2006, during Israel’s war with Hezbollah in Lebanon" - the group said.[1] However, according to Ove Dullum, Chief Scientist of the Norwegian defence institute FFI, the photos on the Human Rights Watch web site actually showed bomblets made in Israel, as it was identical to one of the kinds of bomblets used in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict. The claim came in an interview with Sveriges Radio, and was also aired on NRK radio. He told that both HRW as well as the NPA (which upon the rumours about the use of bomblets had launched a protest against Russia), had received this info from him. [2] Human Rights Watch said on September 1 that Georgia had admitted to using cluster bombs during the hostilities in South Ossetia, The Associated Press and AFP reported.[8] “Georgian armed forces have GRADLAR 160 multiple launch rocket system and rockets of MK4 LAR 160 type (with M85 bomblets) with the range of 45 kilometers,” the Georgian MoD said.[9]"

The photo published by HRW is clearly not that of an RBK-250. If you can ID the weapon on the HRW photo, let me know.

UPDATE:

Another blogger has correctly identified the mystery "bomb" in the photo: it is the Israeli-made MK4 LAR 160 cluster rocket used by the GRADLAR MLRS. This is the same weapon used by Israel in the 2006 war against Lebanon, resulting in heavy civilian casualties. In a letter to Human Rights Watch, Georgia's Defense Ministry has officially acknowledged using these weapons against the Russians, but now Georgia is denying its acknowledgment. Typical Saakashvili for you. Available evidence indicates that Georgian artillery used this weapon against Russian armor near the village of Ruisi, but ended up hitting its civilian residents. MLRS primarily use unguided rockets and are notoriously inaccurate. Such weapons are usually employed against large concentrations of enemy armor or personnel. The fact that the Georgians decided to use this weapon near one of their own villages is a sign of utter panic in the face of advancing Russian armor.

"A battery of Israeli-made Gradlar multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) mounted on Actros 3341 Mercedes 6x6 trucks took part in Georgia's Independence Day parade in Tblisi on 20 January. One of the vehicles was armed with 26 single-shot launch tubes for Israeli-designed 45-km range 160 mm rockets, with the remainder carrying box launchers for 40 Soviet-designed 122 mm rockets. Intended to outrange the 122 mm rockets used by Abkhaz separatists, the new MRLs join an armoury of about 16 122 mm BM-21s and a reported eight RM-70 MRLs in Georgian service. Local press accounts emphasised the availability of Israel Military Industries' Trajectory Correction System guided munitions for the 160 mm rocket, but there is no confirmation that this system is in Georgian service." (Source: "Tblisi witnesses Gradlar multiple rocket launchers on parade", by David C. Isby, Jane's Missiles & Rockets, March 3, 2008)

In the original HRW photo you can clearly see chambered tail fins characteristic of tube-launched munitions. When inside the tube, the spring-loaded fins wrap around the rocket's body and unfold when the rocket is ejected from the launcher. When the rocket approaches the target area, its external casing peals away, revealing the rotary drum with cluster submunitions. The person responsible for misidentifying this Israeli rocket as a Russian aviation bomb twice its size is Marc Garlasco, senior military analyst at Human Rights Watch and former intelligence analyst at Pentagon. Back in the days Marc was one of the guy at Pentagon looking for evidence of WMDs in Iraq. I think we identified the source of the problem. The low level of technical expertise and questionable ethics of Human Rights Watch, which is still refusing to admit the mistake and to publish a retraction, will inevitably undermine its mission and raise questions among its supporters.

UPDATE 2:

Some background info on the LAR-160 and related systems:

"ISRAEL MILITARY INDUSTRIES EXPANDS LAR ROCKET-SYSTEM FAMILY
JANE'S INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE REVIEW
DATE: 01-May-1998
EDITION: 1998
VOLUME/ISSUE: 031/005
p 23

Israel Military Industries (IMI) is developing GradLAR, a variant of
its LAR 160mm light artillery rocket system that upgrades existing
Russian-designed Splav BM-21 Grad fire units so that they can
operate either type.
The company is also studying a shipborne derivative known as NavLAR.
In either case, the launcher can fire standard LAR rounds or IMI's
new AccuLAR version, which incorporates a Trajectory Control System
(TCS). The company is also studying long-range artillery rockets
using TCS as an inexpensive alternative to battlefield support
missiles.
TCS remains effective at distances out to 120km (beyond which the
round's apogee is above the height at which aerodynamic trajectory
correction is effective).
IMI is developing GradLAR on behalf of an unspecified export
customer. The upgrade involves modifying existing vehicle mounts so
that they can accept either the standard Grad launcher (which
generally has 40 tubes) or a pair of 13-round LAR pods.
This allows a user to install either type as required, with LAR
providing substantially longer range (45km with its standard payload
of 104 anti-personnel/anti-materiel bomblets) than variants of the
Russian rocket. A new fire-control system can handle both types of
round.
Alternatively, the modular design of the LAR pod (with alternating
rows of two and three tubes each) allows IMI to offer variants with
different numbers of rounds.
The company is collaborating with Elbit on studies of NavLAR, which
could arm vessels with displacements down to about 1,000 tonnes and
is designed to operate in up to sea state 4. The fully stabilized
mount combines technology from systems that Elbit has developed for
the Merkava tank turret, which provide azimuth control and mitigate
shock loading, with the elevation arrangement from the company's
Deseaver naval countermeasures launcher. NavLAR can fire a salvo of
up to 26 rockets from two watertight pods in 50s, and can be
reloaded in less than 15min.
Both GradLAR and NavLAR, in addition to existing systems, can fire
the AccuLAR trajectory-controlled round. IMI, which is additionally
working with Lockheed Martin Vought Systems and other contractors on
installing the TCS in the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS - see
IDR 12/1997, pp43-49), says that it has a large contract from the
Israel Defense Forces for develop and production of the technology.
AccuLAR retains the same maximum range (45km) as the present Mk 4
version of the free-flight round but has a claimed circular error
probable (CEP) that is one-sixth that of the basic rocket, allowing
it to compete with gun artillery in terms of accuracy. The addition
of the TCS adds only 35 per cent to the price yet, according to IMI,
allows a battery to carry out a typical mission with only one-tenth
the number of free-flight rockets that would be required. Also,
accurate control of the dispensing height permits the adoption of a
version of the bomblet containing a self-destruct fuze, without the
risk of premature detonation.
The incorporation of a TCS requires no changes to the rocket motor
or payload bay, or to the launcher. The addition of new processors
and datalink antennas to the standard vehicle-mounted battery
command post (BCP) allows it to repeatedly interrogate the round's
onboard transponder in flight. Processing of the retransmitted
returns enables the ground-based equipment to determine the rocket's
actual position (and hence its distance downrange) compared with the
predicted value.
The forebody accommodates a small gas generator that exhausts
through opposing ports, which alternately open and close under
command from the BCP. These change the impact point by pitching the
nose up or down, using aerodynamic forces (lift) rather than thrust
to alter the trajectory. The BCP continues to measure the rocket's
position, and resets the nose-mounted electronic time fuze, with the
final update occurring only 2-3s before the bomblets are dispensed."

(Source: Jane's Information Group)

"Israel Military Industries Ltd (IMI)

Rocket Systems Division (RSD)

Address
PO Box 1044/6044
IL-47100 Ramat Hasharon
Israel

Tel : (+972 8) 924 26 84
        (+972 8) 927 74 47
        (+972 8) 927 74 49
Fax : (+972 8) 925 28 96

Key Personnel
Marketing Director: Israel Weinreb
e-mail: iweinreb@imi-israel.com
General Manager RSD and Vice President IMI: Nathan Wechester
Marketing Department: Rhonda Gannon
e-mail: rgannon@imi.israel.com

Activities/Services
Design, development and manufacture of solid rocket weapon systems and components. Products include: rocket launchers, artillery rockets, anti-tank missiles, rocket motors, satellite launchers and fabricated composite materials and pyrotechnics. Comprised of four strategic business units: Rocket Propulsion Business Unit - provides propulsion systems for the Ofeq satellite launcher and the Gabriel anti-ship and Shafir air-to-air missiles. Also develop and produce SDIO Arrow boosters. Rocket Ordnance Business Unit - develop and manufacture Light Artillery Rocket (LAR) systems. It is developing the high-precision LAR system Accular and Shipon, an advanced personal anti-tank guided weapon. Its Trajectory Correcting System (TCS) can be used on all IMI RSD rockets such as the LAR and the GRADLAR and is being implemented on the MLRS for the Israel Defense Forces. This unit has participated in the LAROM upgrade of 122mm multiple rocket launchers in service in Romania. Pyrotechnics Plant - Develop and manufacture infra-red and chaff countermeasures products including pyrotechnic safety systems for the Arrow missile. This unit has designed a countermeasure protection for helicopters. The plant is the national source of igniter systems for infantry and artillery rockets and of safety devices for space launchers, ballistic missiles and the Arrow ABM missile. Technologies Business Unit - Supplies a range of filament-wound autoclaved and moulded products for aerospace and civil markets as well as for incorporation in rocket motors. Products include ballistic protection systems for vehicles and personal ballistic protection vests and inserts. "

(Source: Jane's International Defence Directory, October 4, 2007)

The EU Gets the Pipe

Sun, 31 Aug 2008 21:17:15 GMT

As expected, the EU resolution on Russia was all gasconade and bravado. Russia's unspoken threat to restrict energy supplies to the European Union did the trick. Gordon Brown found out that a “root-and-branch” review of relations with Russia may be difficult when you are covered head to toe in Russian oil. Today Russia is supplying nearly 35% of oil and 40% of natural gas consumed by the European Union. The EU is desperate to diversify its natural gas and oil supplies.

The key component in this diversification plan is the proposed Nabucco natural gas pipeline linking Erzurum, Turkey with Central Europe. The Nabucco project will connect with the gas pipeline running from Azerbaijan via unstable Georgia and separatist-infested Turkey. Not exactly the most dependable of arrangements. Just a few weeks ago PKK militants in Turkey blew up the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and threatened more such attacks in the future. Not to mention that the pipeline passes near another unstable, ethnically-distinct and potentially breakaway region of Georgia – Ajaria, which also controls Georgia's largest commercial port in Batumi.

A possible decision by the EU to postpone the EU-Russia summit may force Putin to look for a new place to sleep. (Source: MARKKU ULANDER/AFP/Getty Images, Putin at the 2006 EU-Russia Summit)

For its part, Russia is also seeking to diversify its gas and oil export markets. The key to Russia's plan is the nearly 3,000-mile Eastern Pipeline, linking East Siberia and the Pacific Ocean. The pipeline project, with an estimated cost of $24 billion, has been delayed by one year due to adverse weather conditions and technical problems. Also, because of environmental concerns, the pipeline had to be moved 25 miles north of lake Baikal. After stepping down as Russia's president, Putin took personal charge of the pipeline project, which is currently due to open in late 2009. The pipeline will give Russian oil producers direct access to markets in China, Korea, and Japan, dramatically increasing Russia's leverage over the European Union. In the pipeline war, Russia's vast size is a definite advantage.

On Sunday, ahead of the EU meeting in Brussels, Medvedev announced that Russia's recognition of independence of Georgia's two breakaway regions was irreversible. He also announced that Russia will sign bilateral agreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia to provide these two nations economic, social, humanitarian, and military assistance. The purpose and timing of this announcement were to show the EU that an economic confrontation with Russia was not going to change Russia's policies toward Georgia and its former territories.

So why, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the Europeans and the Americans still lack any kind of useful leverage against Russia? The various complicated reasons boil down to two simple points: political mistrust and economic protectionism that force the West to keep Russian businesses at an arm's length. The US still haven't repealed the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment denying Russia “most favored nation” trading status due to emigration restrictions. Such restrictions in Russia have been lifted in the late 1980s. The result of this pigheaded approach to doing business with Russia is that, when push comes to shove, the West finds itself without means to influence Russian foreign policy, while still dependent on Russian oil and gas.

Operation Coverass

Sun, 31 Aug 2008 04:56:56 GMT

On Monday the EU is expected to announce countermeasures to Russia's recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian diplomatic sources hinted that any practical economic sanctions against Russia may lead to reduced oil supplies to the European Union. And so the question is: does the Brussels have the balls to take on Moscow or will the EU's response be just another diplomatic fart in Russia's general direction.

A senior French diplomatic source was quoted by Reuters as saying that no specific sanctions against Russia will be announced at the EU meeting on Monday. The EU is choosing between two draft resolutions against Russia: the “mild” one prepared by Italy and the “tough” one prepared by the UK and Poland. The Italian version does not call for any specific sanctions – economic or otherwise – against Russia.

Forecasting Russia's political future is as difficult as it is entertaining. My personal opinion is that the EU will choose against sanctions. Following the spike in oil prices earlier this year and mass strikes by truck drivers and fishermen across the European Union, it is difficult to see European leaders wishing to repeat the experience. In the recent weeks Russia showed that it is not all talk. There is no reason to doubt that Russia will make good on its promise to restrict energy supplies to Europe.

Gordon Brown is talking tough, which I find suspicious. Whenever Brown is full of hot air and needs to vent, he starts using colorful language, rich in metaphor but lacking in substance. Like when he threatened a “root and branch” review of relations with Russia or promised urgent action to prevent Britain “sleepwalking” into an energy dependence on Russia. Brown also argues for more funding for the pipeline project to carry Caspian gas to Europe via Turkey.

Unless Britain plans to have the pipeline ready by Monday, my guess is the EU's upcoming resolution will be limited to tough language and unspecified threats against future political cooperation with Russia. Something in Brown's tone and his choice of words tells me that all this bluster is how he covers his ass ahead of tomorrow's toothless resolution. A typical middle manager behavior. And cover his ass he must, for Miliband set us up for the greatest show on Earth, but what's coming is another rerun of “Law and Order”.

The War in Georgia

Thu, 28 Aug 2008 19:26:05 GMT

For the past two weeks I've been trying to collect as much information as possible about the situation in Georgia. I talked to more than a dozen Russian and US military experts, got in touch with my contacts in Tbilisi and North Ossetia, and exchanged information with dozens of journalists in Moscow and here in the States. The goal of spending all this free time - normally reserved for fishing - was to piece together the most complete picture of the events in the Caucasus. My main worry was that someone will beat me to the punch (like the Asia Times or Jane's), rendering all my efforts redundant. Luckily, no one did.

Don't get me wrong: volumes have been written on the subject of Georgia's attack on South Ossetia and the subsequent military action by Russia against Saakashvili's regime. Most of these reports and analyses were rubbish, but some were good – in a very limited way. All the people writing on the situation in Georgia and relations with Russia can be separated into four categories: idiots, the good old boys, gearheads, and strategists. The idiots talk primarily about how the West should punish Russia (or, in case with Russian idiots, how Russia should punish the West). The good old boys are trying to revive the language and ideas of the Cold War era. The gearheads are counting the tanks, comparing missile ranges, and analyzing tactical maneuvers. And, finally, the strategists are overreaching themselves in trying to predict the future.

I probably belong in all four categories. I think Russia should take more definitive steps to reassert itself on the international arena. For years I've been criticizing Putin for his timid foreign policy. I am convinced the Cold War never really ended. I have no doubt that, despite all the dangers, the Cold War was one of the most productive periods in the development of human civilization – our culture, science and technology. I've been known to spend weeks reading nothing but technical specifications of tanks, fighter jets, and missiles. And, as a noted armchair admiral, I would rarely pass up an opportunity to make a strategic prediction, far too often ending up looking like a complete jackass just a few months later.

Read my full report on the war in Georgia. It's too long for the blog format, so I had to upload it as a PDF file.

Saakashvili Finally Loses It

Mon, 25 Aug 2008 05:36:31 GMT

Ever since Georgia launched its military operation against South Ossetia, killing Russian peacekeepers and hundreds of its own civilians, many have been asking the same question: has Saakashvili gone stark raving mad? It's now official: yes. In his latest interview to Financial Times, Saakashvili revealed dark depths of madness that made even Putin shudder:

"The first thing that happened was that the Russian tanks came in," Mr Saakashvili told the Financial Times during a late night interview in his office. He added: "From our point of view [the Georgian military] was responding to a Russian invasion."

Mr Saakashvili's claims could not be independently verified.

However, on the night of August 7, when Georgian forces began their rocket and artillery barrage of Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, Brigadier General Mamuka Kurashvili, the chief of Georgian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, went on Georgian television to say Georgia's "power-wielding bodies" had "decided to restore constitutional order" in the breakaway region.

Mr Saakashvili denies ever using those words. He said his forces moved to slow a Russian advance into Georgia in order to "confront them for three days and to wake up the world".

General Kurashvili also did not mention Russian armour...

In Mr Saakashvili's version, he is blameless for the resulting crisis that has destroyed much of the Georgian military...

..."In terms of trying to remove me, the Russians have grossly miscalculated. If you attack a democratic country and say that your main target is the president, it doesn't make the president weaker," said Mr Saakashvili.

(Source: Saakashvili lays blame for crisis firmly on Russia, by Jan Cienski, Financial Times, August 25, 2008)

So far we have seen Saakashvili rolling in dirt in Gori, as he was trying to evade an imaginary Russian helicopter; we've seen him chewing on his necktie as he was preparing to deliver a speech to journalists in Tbilisi; we've seen Saakashvili accuse Gorbachev on Larry King Live of being a KGB propaganda agent; and, of course, who can forget Saakashvili's televised PR appearances in his Tbilisi office decorated with EU and US flags.

Needless to say, by denying the history of what happened in South Ossetia on August 7-8, Saakashvili compromises the ceasefire agreement and everyone who stood behind it, including Sarkozy and Rice. If the Kremlin wishes so, it can easily portray Saakashvili's latest statements as yet another reason why Russian peacekeepers need protection from the Tbilisi madman.

I am afraid I wasted a whole lot of time trying to analyze Georgia's tactics and strategy in this war. It would seem that the war in Georgia will be best explained not by military analysts but by psychiatrists. As if Saakashvili's brutal aggression and humiliating defeat were not enough embarrassment for the US and the EU, it now appears that for the past four years NATO has been arming and training an army led by a certifiable nutcase. I just can't wait to see Dr. Rice and Sarkozy spin that one.

Old Dogs, Old Tricks.

Sat, 23 Aug 2008 07:02:12 GMT

Just finished reading “How to Deter Russia”, by William Courtney and Kenneth Yalowitz (The Washington Post, August 23, 2008, p. A15). Courtney is the former US Ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia. Yalowitz is the former US Ambassador to Belarus and Georgia. It is absolutely astonishing how two diplomats with so much relevant experience can misinterpret the situation in Georgia so badly. Here's what these two clowns have to say:

“Western policy should have three dimensions: countering Russian aggression, enhancing regional deterrence, and strengthening recovery and governance in Georgia. All will raise the cost of future aggression.”

Enhancing regional deterrence? This is diplomatic for “rearming Saakashvili's military”. Some people never learn. They are still thinking that, perhaps, if Georgia had more tanks or anti-aircraft weapons, it could have defeated or at least deterred the Russians. This line of thinking is what got Saakashvili and his Washington masters in trouble in the first place. Courtney and Yalowitz propose more of the same. Insanity, they say, is doing the same thing over and over again, expecting a different result.

Here's another pearl or strategic thinking:

“The Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and Georgia's South Caucasus neighbors -- Azerbaijan and Armenia -- have shared interests in secure, unimpeded energy and overland transport to Georgia's Black Sea ports and Turkey.”

I got some news for the two former Ambassadors: Azerbaijan and Armenia are still at war over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia has been keeping peace between the two neighbors since 1994. Armenia is closely aligned with Russia and Azerbaijan is unlikely to repeat Saakashvili's mistakes.

And the brilliant conclusion of the “what-not-to-do” action plan by Courtney and Yalowitz:

“Russia won a tactical victory in Georgia over an outgunned and much smaller force. Ultimately, however, the attack is likely to put in motion forces that will diminish Moscow's ability to treat neighbors with impunity. Deterring future aggression is the best response -- and starts with strengthening the countries in that region.”

So, maybe 200 tanks wasn't enough for Georgia to defeat the Russians. How about 300 tanks? I think that should do the trick. Courtney and Yalowitz are old men and, I guess, it's silly to hope for any fresh ideas from them. Still, one would expect lessons to be learned, especially from the kind of beating Georgia received not two weeks ago. Instead of rearming Georgia, the US can just flush its millions of dollars down the toilet: the result will be the same.

Here's a crazy idea: why not just leave Russia alone inside its safety zone before we get into a fight nobody can win.

US Confirms It Knew of Georgia's Plan to Attack South Ossetia

Fri, 22 Aug 2008 07:30:10 GMT

In its August 22 issue, the Russian business daily Kommersant published the interview with the new US Ambassador to Russia John Beyrly. As should have been expected of an experienced diplomat, Ambassador Beyrly said a lot about nothing. Although he did bring up a couple of points worth mentioning. John Beyrly is a fluent Russian speaker and the interview was conducted in Russian.

"We see that the response by the Russian forces to the attack against Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia was well founded," said Beyrly. ("Мы видим, что российские войска вполне обоснованно ответили на нападение на миротворцев РФ в Южной Осетии.") Ambassador Beyrly went on to say that it was the move into Georgia proper by the Russian forces that the US found unacceptable.

When asked if the US supported Georgia's actions in South Ossetia, Beyrly responded: "The fact that, to the last moment we urged the Georgian side not to take this step, clearly shows that we did not want for any of this to happen." ("Тот факт, что мы очень настойчиво убеждали грузинскую сторону не идти на этот шаг, ясно говорит о том, что мы не хотели, чтобы все это произошло.") Incidentally, a few days ago the US Ambassador to NATO, Kurt Volkner, told the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: "Including the day before Georgian troops went into South Ossetia, we said, 'don't do it, don't be drawn into a military conflict, it's not in your interests."

Why are these statements important? A couple of reasons. First, by saying that Russia's military response was "well founded", the US distances itself from Saakashvili's regime. The US position seems contradictory: on the one hand we have noisy proclamations of support for the Georgian president and on the other hand - at least a partial approval of Russia's military action against Georgia. There is a good reason for all this vagueness and doublespeak on the part of the US Department of State. And this reason is simple enough: the US knew ahead of time that Georgia was planning to attack and did nothing to warn the Russians.

Chances are, Russia also knew about the planned attacked. I don't mean the exact timing and tactics, but Russia knew that the attack by Georgia against South Ossetia was likely, if not inevitable. However, it appears from the statements by Beyrly and Volkner that the US might have had additional details about the planned attack. This should not be hard to believe, considering that the US military instructors were training Georgian soldiers and had to know the details of the planned operation. Washington's failure to contain its puppet in Tbilisi, as well the failure on the part of the US to warn Russia and South Ossetia, resulted in the deaths of over a dozen Russian peacekeepers and hundreds of South Ossetian civilians.

Avoiding responsibility and covering ass are things Americans do best. Washington is talking tough but is afraid to ruin relations with Russia. American economy is not doing terribly well and the US military is already stretched to the limit. In a single day of trading at NYMEX oil prices jumped nearly $6 and commodities headed for their biggest weekly gain in 33 years. Most analysts cite tensions with Russia as the primary driving force behind these gains.

The sharp increase in the oil price is particularly interesting in light of a huge jump in crude inventories. The rule of thumb usually is that oil prices drop as inventory grows. During the week ending August 15 the increase of oil inventory was a whopping 9.4 million barrels, while the forecast called for a 1.7 million-barrel increase. In other words, we should have seen a moderate drop in oil prices and instead prices grew rapidly.

The EU is not doing much better. As G7 is heading for recession, nobody needs a confrontation with Russia. If you thought that Fannie May and Freddie Mac are messing up global economy, wait until the Kremlin starts pulling strings in the Middle East and in South America to disrupt oil supplies. This is the kind of excitement the US economy can do without.

And so, outgoing Bush wants to appear tough on Russia to save face and to pacify hardliners in Congress. The desire for toughness needs to be carefully balanced with the need to maintain decent relations with Moscow and not let the situation deteriorate into another cold war. It's hard to be a hardliner without money.

Georgia's Propaganda War

Thu, 21 Aug 2008 06:53:17 GMT

Saakashvili must be still under the impression that his presidency will be saved by the outgoing Bush administration. Georgian propaganda warriors continue with their efforts. The New York Times decided to jump on the bandwagon:

In the Georgian village of Shindisi on Wednesday, three journalists from The New York Times were present when a researcher from Human Rights Watch found two unexploded cluster munitions on the ground. The question of whether in the conflict Russia used cluster munitions, which are weapons that release hundreds of bomblets when they explode, has been a source of intense dispute. Russia has vehemently denied using them and called allegations that it used those munitions “lies” that were prepared before the war. But there have been many indications that cluster munitions were in fact used.

(Source: Despite Yielding Ground, Russia Takes Critical Spots, by Andrew Kramer, The New York Times, August 20, 2008)

Picture this: the small village of Shindisi surrounded by Caucasus mountains. A few goats are peacefully grazing on a lush green hillside. The village is just big enough for the local commuter train to make a quick stop there on its way to Gori. Most Georgians who don't ride the train every day to work will be hard-pressed to point out Shindisi on a map. Three NY Times jounrnalists appear out of the morning mist to witness a Human Rights Watch researcher stumbling onto two tiny unexploded cluster bomblets...

I've heard some stories in my life. God is my witness, if there is a bullshit shoveling contest, I am sure I can keep up with the best of them. But this... This was a work of genius: not only did the Georgians manage to find some old Soviet cluster bombs that I wouldn't touch with a 100-yard pole, they also managed to find the three most gullible journalists at The New York Times. I can understand if, say, a local goatherder found the bomblets, called the authorities and they invited the journalists. But they aren't even trying.

The Human Rights Watch "researcher" walking out of the local pub: Hey, look - cluster bombs. Where are those damned journalists when you really need them? Oh, here they are!

At least they didn't find an unexploded Russian nuclear bomb...

BBC is not Paying Attention

Wed, 20 Aug 2008 18:50:27 GMT

In the Russia scales down Georgia toll BBC claims:

Russia has issued new, reduced casualty figures for the Georgian conflict, with 133 civilians now listed as dead in the disputed region of South Ossetia. The figure is far lower than the 1,600 people Russia initially said had died.

In reality, however, Russian prosecutors announced that so far they have identified 133 of the killed civilians. See the difference? I mean, for God's sake, don't they know how to read in England anymore? Perhaps they are in such a rush to push out a sensationalist headline that they don't let their common sense to interfere with their "news reporting". The fact that Britain's leading news agency is state-controlled is bad enough, but this kind of nonsense raises questions not just about BBC's objectivity, but about its professionalism as well.

In 1999 NATO was bombing Yugoslavia using precision-guided bombs and killed more than 2,600 civilians. So what do you suppose would be the number of civilian casualties if for several hours you used heavy artillery and MLRS to bombard a town with a population of 40,000? According to Georgian military commanders - no civilian casualties (every Georgian thinks that all Ossetians are criminals and subhumans), and according to BBC "journalists" - 133. Both need to stop smoking crack.

Latest Developments in Georgia

Wed, 20 Aug 2008 03:30:56 GMT

The Independent just published the most ridiculous timeline of Russia's operation in Georgia. It is not surprising since the article relies on analysis by Pavel Felgenhauer – Russia's leading quack in the field of military pseudo-analysis distilled for amateur foreign journalists who can't read. The problem with “A new world order: The week Russia flexed its military muscle” starts pretty much in the opening paragraph: “The outcome was the humiliating rout of the Georgian army, pushed back by a huge Russian land, air and sea assault...” Apparently a 15,000-strong Russian force fighting the 32,000-strong Georgian army constitutes “David versus Goliath combat in the Caucasus on 8 August.” Not to mention that on August 8 Russia didn't even have 15,000 troops on the ground in Georgia. Most Russian troops were still in transit. On top of this, the vast majority of Russian forces deployed in Georgia never fired a shot: the Georgian army was running too fast for the Russians to catch up.

Let's forgive The Independent its amateurism and pay attention to the more serious publications. An excellent review of the Russian military operation in Georgia was published in the August 20 edition of Asia Times: “Georgian planning flaws led to failure”, by Richard Giragosian. The article contains the most detailed description of Russian units, equipment and tactics used in the war. A great analysis of the geopolitical reasons and consequences of the war was also published by Asia Times: “Americans play Monopoly, Russians chess”, by Spengler. It gives you a great insight into motives behind Russia's actions. A brief but accurate description of the Russian operation in Georgia was published by Jane's: “Flashpoint Georgia”, by Nick Brown and Christopher F Foss. In other words, if you are trying to understand what is going on in Georgia, stick with sources that specialize in defense and geopolitical analysis, instead of the ones focusing on London's social gossip.

Pentagon sources report that Russia is deploying short-range ballistic missile launchers SS-21 "Tochka" in South Ossetia. The missile will give Russia immediate strike capability across much of Georgia's territory.

So, what is going on in Georgia and how will it all end... The Russians departed from Georgia's naval base in Poti, but then returned and blew up the “Dioskuria” missile boat, Georgia's most advanced naval vessel. Russian aviation destroyed most Georgian air defense radars, runways and bases across the country. According to a number of reports, Russia is deploying SS-21 short-range ballistic missile launchers in South Ossetia. This should give Russia short-notice strike capability against stationary or area targets across most of Georgia's territory. There have been some reports of Russia deploying advanced air defenses to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These may include long-range SAMs to control airspace over all of Georgia. Additional air reconnaissance assets are being deployed at Russian airbases near Georgia to monitor movements of Georgian troops. The Russian army was ready for this conflict, but it had to keep its preparations low-key so not to alarm or discourage Saakashvili's military geniuses planning the attack against South Ossetia. Right now the Russians no longer need to hide their activities along Georgia's border and so the Russian army will want to cover all of its bases (and all of Georgia's bases as well).

Georgia's "Dioskuria" fast missile craft was blown up by Russian forces at its base in Poti.

The BBC finally decided to shine a light on the Georgian army's brilliant performance and casualties in this short but devastating for Georgia war:

Feet poked out of green military body bags. They were on the floor and in the cabinets - 16 bodies I counted. This was just from the first part of the day, staff said.

"They've been dying before we could treat them," one doctor told us later.

A senior doctor said the hospital had been handling an average of 350 casualties each day. ..

As the week progressed and the news got worse, we heard more and more Georgians denouncing their government for getting into this unequal war...

Much of Georgia's American-trained army is in disarray. Many troops have taken off their uniforms and returned home.

We came across several units who admitted they had no orders and did not know what to do. But there are still Georgian troops posted along the roads and highways, close to Russian lines.

(Source: “Georgia reeling from war with Russia”, by Andrew North, BBC, August 18, 2008)

Interesting to note that so far Saakashvili's defense minister acknowledged the loss of just over two hundred of his soldiers. The Russian military gave a conservative estimate of Georgia's military casualties at two thousand dead. As wartime patriotism in Georgia gives way to criticism of the government's actions, Saakashvili has good reasons to conceal the true extent of his army's losses. For different reasons, Russia is also not willing to advertise Georgian losses. Russia and Georgia exchanged a few POWs. Meanwhile, NATO brass gathered in Brussels and after a lengthy meeting came to an agreement: they don't think it was very nice of Russia to invade Georgia. They say Putin had to cry himself to sleep that night. Russia accused NATO of protecting a criminal regime and pulled out of a naval exercise in the Baltic Sea and canceled a visit by a US naval frigate to Kamchatka, thus beating NATO to the punch once again.

Russia's War Booty

Mon, 18 Aug 2008 00:57:48 GMT

Strength and composition of the Georgian army are a big mystery. I checked over a dozen of authoritative sources and no two report the same numbers. Jane's published a detailed list of major weapons acquisitions by Georgia since 2000. However, in the past few days the Russian military captured weapons not previously known to be in Georgia's inventory.

One of the more interesting finds were six 9A33 “Osa” (NATO designation: SA-8 “Gecko”) mobile SAMs. The “Osa” is a tough little package that carries powerful radars and a six-missile launcher on a 6x6 amphibious chassis. The system is highly mobile and notoriously difficult to track. The “Osa” can take out targets ranging from cruise missiles flying at an altitude of 25 meters to supersonic bombers at 5 kilometers. In 1999 the SA-8 was credited with most ground-to-air kills of NATO manned and unmanned aircraft – both acknowledged and unacknowledged by NATO officials. Not a single Yugoslav SA-8 was destroyed or captured by NATO during or after the war.

Six upgraded SA-8 "Osa" mobile medium-range SAMs belonging to the Georgian army were captured intact by the Russian ground forces. The SAMs were secretly purchased from Ukraine in 2006-2007. An SA-8 of the Polish army is pictured above.

Where did Georgia get these SAMs? The two most likely sources are the same as for Georgia's other weapons purchases: Ukraine and the Czech Republic. Both countries are marketing upgraded SA-8s. Here's a brief note from the August 2008 Jane's World Air Forces about Georgia buying one SA-8:

“Georgia has no interceptor aircraft and until 2006 was incapable of engaging enemy aircraft flying above 8,000 m with its ageing Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs). First steps in rectifying this deficiency was taken in 2006 with the modernisation of Georgia's Air Operations Centre connecting military and civilian radar networks and weapons fire control systems, as well as the procurement of a mobile OSA-AKM 9M33M3 (SA-8 Gecko) SAM system from Ukraine. This should extend interception range above 10,000 m but still only has an effective range of 15 km.”

It would seem that this one SA-8 was shortly followed by another six from Ukraine. Previously I mentioned that Georgia would made an emphasis of beefing up its air defense, if Tbilisi was expecting Russian military response to the attack on Tskhinvali. Now it appears that Georgia did spend quite a bit of money of upgrading its air defenses and, therefore, did at the very least anticipate a military response from Russia. According to the latest official Russian reports, three Russian Su-25 ground attack jets and one Tu-22M3R reconnaissance aircraft were lost to Georgian air defenses.

According to Col. Igor Konashenkov, assistant to the Commander of Land Forces of Russia, in the past few days Russian forces captured 65 Georgian tanks. Over 20 of these tanks were destroyed after being captured because they were either damaged or too old (T-62s) to be of any further use. However, about 30 upgraded T-72s (the ones Saakashvili bought from Ukraine and the Czech Republic in 2005) were hauled away by the Russian vehicle recovery squads. It is interesting that Georgia deployed virtually its entire tank force to deal with South Ossetia. Clearly, Tbilisi's hope was for a quick and overwhelming victory against the poorly-armed South-Ossetian militia.

Georgian T-72 main battle tanks leave Gori, some 46 km from the border of Georgia and South Ossetia, in 2006 (Source, photo and caption: Jane's Defense Weekly, January 2, 2007)

In addition to the 65 tanks and 6 SA-8s, the Russians also captured 15 BMP-2 APCs, a number of D-30 towed howitzers, the Czech-made “Dana” self-propelled howitzers, and US-made armored vehicles (the type was not named). According to Col. Konashenkov, most of the armored vehicle were upgraded by Ukraine.

US-trained Georgian soldiers during a farewell ceremony at the Krtsanisi military training centre outside the Georgian capital Tbilisi in March 2006. about to leave for Iraq (Source, photo and caption: Jane's Defense Weekly, January 2, 2007). From Venik: someone should have told Saakashvili that having his army look like Americans was not enough to fight the Russians.

Earlier in the week Russian troops raided the Georgian military base near Gori. This is one of Georgia's largest bases and was the primary staging point for the push into South-Ossetia by the Georgian army. At the base the Georgians left 15 main battle tanks, dozens of APCs and towed artillery pieces, tons of artillery rounds and unguided rockets. All of the equipment was reported by the Russian to be in working order. The Russians destroyed the ammunition and moved other captured equipment outside of Georgia.

The military base at Senaki, which was opened in 2006 (Source, photo and caption: Jane's/D Hammick)

At another military base near the town of Senaki – also abandoned by the Georgian army without a fight – the Russians 1,728 firearms, including 764 M16 US-made automatic rifles, 28 US-made M-40 machine guns, 754 Kalashnikov automatic rifles of various models, handguns and other weapons. Earlier the same day Russian aviation destroyed two Georgian military helicopters – an Mi-24B/P and an Mi-8MT – at the Senaki military airfield.

Just a reminder, several days ago Georgia's fast guided missile boats attempted to intercept warships of the Russian Black Sea Navy. The Russian vessels opened fire before Georgian attack boats got in range. One Georgian French-made Combattante II Class craft, purchased from Greece in 2004, was sank.

Interior ministry troops advance toward anti-government protesters down Tbilisi’s main avenue on 7 November 2007 (PA Photos). From Venik: beating unarmed civilian is the Georgian army's main speciality. Take a closer look at the hexagonal dish in the background on the right and the round dish on the left: these are the American Technology Medium Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs), aka the "sonic guns" - some of the most inhumane "non-lethal" weapons designed to apply HF sonic vibrations to your internal organs.

Today in Kodori, Abkhazia, local self-defense force captured a number of Georgian 127-mm and 82-mm mortars, 120-mm D-30 towed howitzers, 100-mm artillery pieces, anti-aircraft guns, several BM-21 “Grad” MLRS systems, and over a thousand firearms of various types.

Since 2004 Saakashvili spent nearly $2.5 billion (including nearly $300 million in military aid from the US and Turkey) on training his army and buying weapons. The primary sources of these new and upgraded weapons were Ukraine and the Czech Republic. Now most of this hardware will probably be transferred by the Russians to the self-defense forces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Verizon FiOS is still too green. I am back with Comcast.

Sun, 17 Aug 2008 19:02:40 GMT

A quick update on my Verizon saga: I had to cancel my new Verizon Business FiOS and went back to my Comcast Business connection. There are just too many issues with Verizon's service. The primary problems are Verizon's impossible-to-reach customer service and its inept technical support, but there are also issues with quality of signal and network latency.

Did you know, for example, that if you opt-out of Verizon's phone service, you will have to spend up to half-an-hour on the phone before they would finally transfer your call to the appropriate call center? It's true: Verizon support tracks cusotomer accounts using the phone number, but only if you have your phone service with Verizon. If you did not get Verizon's phone service, you will be bounced between different call centers for 10, 20, even 30 minutes before they finally locate your information and patch you through to the right department. I had Verizon Business plan, which comes with a dedicated 24x7 support line, and I was still getting the runaround.

My hardware firewall runs a custom network monitoring script that I wrote a few years ago. Varios network performance data is collected, stored in a database and automatically charted. What I am seeing are unexplained spikes is network latency. Route trace shows that latency is limited to Verizon network. I have no idea what causes this, but I suspect it has something to do with Verizon's PVC configuration. I did not see significant network latency with Comcast.

Calling Verizon tech support is not just incredibly time-consuming, but also completely pointless. They just ping your router and tell you that there is no problem. After some complaining on my part, Verizon sent out a technician. He arrived the very next day but had no idea why they sent him. I showed him network performance stats I collected, but he told me he is not a "network guy". I thanked him for his time and then called Verizon to cancel my subscription. Good thing I still kept my Comcast connection, so switching back was just a matter of reconnecting the coax cable in the garage.

FiOS has good potential, but Verizon still can't get it right. My advise to people who are picky about their network: don't jump on the FiOS bandwagon just yet - give Verizon another year to figure out what it's doing. Comcast is promising a faster network in my area in six months, so maybe I won't have to go back to Verizon.

Holbrooke Paid by Saakashvili?

Sun, 17 Aug 2008 17:58:48 GMT

Richard Holbrooke, the former US Ambassador to the UN and currently the vice chairman of Perseus LLC, is now in Tbilisi accusing the cowardly Russian soldiers of stealing pants off the dead bodies of Georgia's courageous warriors. Holbrooke is claiming that Russia is about to invade Ukraine and is getting ready to take over the world tomorrow night.

The information I have from a friend in Moscow, who is a senior journalist for one of Russia's leading business dailies, suggests that Holbrooke might have received as much as $4.8 million in salary from the Belgian PR firm, contracted by president Saakashvili to work with the journalists in Tbilisi.

For those of you who missed the news, The Times recently published “Georgia loses the fight with Russia, but manages to win the PR war,” by Tony Halpin and Roger Boyes, detailing Saakashvili's attempt to mislead Western journalists operating in Georgia's capital. Here's an excerpt from the article in The Times:

“As foreign correspondents poured into Tbilisi a team of Belgian PR advisers launched a slick operation to keep them updated with e-mail alerts detailing the latest alleged aggressions by Russia and the Georgian Government’s reaction. On Sunday, for example, more than 20 e-mails went out to shape Georgia’s message that Russia had launched an invasion.

Some of the claims veered into outright exaggeration – such as stating that Russian jets were “intensively bombing Tbilisi” or that Russian troops had taken Gori – but the 24-hour news culture meant that many organisations repeated them without independent verification.”

Holbrooke's involvement with the Belgian PR firm would explain his unexpected private visit to Tbilisi today and the ludicrous accusations he is making against the Russian army. In a CNN interview today Holbrooke claimed that the Russian soldiers, dressed in “stolen Georgian uniforms and carrying stolen American M16s”, are looting the town of Gori. Holbrooke provided no evidence to support his accusations.

All of you have seen the video footage of Russian troops in Georgia: the Russians have no problem displaying their national flag on their armored vehicles and they make no secret of their presence in Georgia. If anything, they seem to advertise their presence in the country. Rather than accuse the Russians of wearing stolen Georgian uniforms and carrying the ridiculous M16s, perhaps the more logical assumption would be that some Georgian soldiers, wearing their own uniforms and carrying their own M16s, decided to help themselves to the belongings of the fellow countrymen displaced from Gori by the war and that Richard Holbrooke decided to help himself to a few easy, tax-free millions. The man is just trying to retire - nothing's wrong with that.

Reuters Published Fake Propaganda Photos, Part II

Sun, 17 Aug 2008 05:26:02 GMT

Just a quick follow-up to the story below about Reuters publishing fake photos of civilian victims in Gori. Russian bloggers have identified the photographer responsible for most of these images. He turned out to be Gleb Garanich (Глеб Гаранич) - a Ukrainian photojournalist working for Reuters. The photos, as it turns out, might have been staged.

As I expected, no Photoshop was used, but there is possibility that Garanich used “models” found among the helpful locals to stage his “action” shots. Reuters is still standing by their photographer and maintains that photos are authentic. After being contacted by Russia's Interfax news agency, Reuters released a sequence of photographs taken by Garanich.

It is not clear why Reuters editors thought that this sequence of photos would confirm the authenticity of Garanich's work. If the event was staged – either by Garanich or for his benefit – the sequence of shots released by Reuters confirms nothing. If anything, these photos raise more questions.

Upon close examination, all photos in the sequence released by Reuters show the “victim” on his back. And yet, there is at least one photo made by Garanich that shows the “victim” face down:

This photo was not part of the sequence released by Reuters. We can also see the “grieving relative” from the original sequence of shots, dressed in black calmly surveying the scene. Things just don't add up.

Another shot (below) shows the same “grieving relative” apparently in great distress, but now he is wearing a t-shirt and a black sleeveless shirt, similar to the one from the photo above. Did he go home to get dressed and then came back to pose for other photographers?

The photo above does not have the “Reuters” logo and does not appear in the sequence released by Reuters, so it might have been taken by someone other that Gleb Garanich. This would suggest that Garanich may not have been deliberately misrepresenting the events, but that the entire scene might have been staged for the benefit of visiting photojournalists, including Garanich.

And, of course, nothing explains the BBC video footage that shows the same “victim” being carried “to safety” by Georgian troops. In this BBC video, also shown on Russian TV, you can clearly see that the “victim” is wearing the same sneakers, pants, and shirt and has the same haircut as the subject in Garanich's photos.

Georgia's Attack on South Ossetia: Washington's Role

Sat, 16 Aug 2008 04:14:54 GMT

Elusive NATO Membership

At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008 Georgia was denied Membership Action Plan. Aside from Russia's vehement opposition, the key issues outlined in the NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan, accepted by Georgia in October 2004, remain unresolved. These issues are: Georgia's antiquated military equipment, insufficient training and deployability of its forces, and, most importantly, unresolved ethnic conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Georgia responded to these challenges by requesting US help with training and rearming its forces. The emphasis was made on reducing the size but increasing the quantity and mobility of Georgian army battalions. The 2007 Georgian Strategic Defense Review (SDR) outlined an overall reduction of the country's armed forces from about 28,000 personnel (excluding civilian contractors and reservists) in 2006 to just 18,755 in 2015. Despite this reduction, since 2004 Georgia has been actively acquiring modern weapons. The SDR assumption was that ethnic conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia will be settled by 2012 and Georgia will be ready to join NATO.

April 3, 2008: From lef to right: US President George Bush, Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia; NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Angela Merkel, Federal Chancellor of Germany

There was a little problem with this plan, however. President Saakashvili's second term in office is to end in 2012 and there was no guarantee that he would still be in office by the time Georgia was ready to join NATO. With military aid from the US, addressing the issues of training, restructuring and rearming Georgian armed forces was only a matter of sticking to the timetable worked out by American advisors. The simmering ethnic conflicts in the two breakaway republics were the big unknown. It seemed highly unlikely that either Abkhazia or South Ossetia would come under Tbilisi's control voluntarily. One option would have been to grant the two provinces wide-ranging autonomy. However, such an action would not have been accepted by Saakashvili's ultra-nationalist supporters in the parliament.

Preparing for War

As part of its rigorous rearmament program, Georgia purchased 30 towed (122-mm D-30) and 12 self-propelled (152-mm “Dana”) howitzers from the Czech Republic in 2006; 6 Mi-24B/P and 2 Mi-8MT assault helicopters from Ukraine in 2005; 31 T-72 main battle tanks from Ukraine and the Czech Republic in 2005; 25 120-mm mortars from the Czech Republic and Bosnia also in 2005; 20 BTR-80 armored personnel carriers from Ukraine in 2005; 12 self-propelled 152-mm 2S3M howitzers from Ukraine in 2004; one Mi-35 assault helicopter from Uzbekistan in 2004; 40 BMP-2 APCs from Ukraine in 2004; 14 120-mm mortars from Bulgaria in 2004; 6 122 mm RM-70 MLRS systems from the Czech Republic in 2003; and other heavy weapons, including fast attack craft, more mortars, howitzers and helicopters. (Source: Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, August 2008; see the complete list of Georgia's weapons acquisitions since 2000 at the end of this article).

Georgian T-72 tanks during a training exercise 30 km outside Tbilisi in Vaziani on February 14, 2008 (Source: AFP)

Georgia's defense budget has grown from USD 20 million in 2001 to USD 734 million in 2007 and over USD 900 million in 2008. Accounting for inflation, this is roughly a 40-fold increase in military spending in just six years. So when Irakli Alasania, Georgia's UN Ambassador, tells the UN Security Council that his country is “a small and peace-loving nation”, the logical question should be: what does a peace-loving nation need with so many new howitzers, mortars, armored personnel carriers, tanks, missile boats, and helicopter gunships? According to the World Bank statistics, the GDP of Georgia has grown from USD 3.2 billion in 2001 to USD 6.39 billion in 2005. The CIA World Factbook puts Georgia's GDP for 2007 at USD 10.29 billion – an optimistic estimate so far not confirmed by the World Bank. Even so, between 2001 and 2007 Georgian military budget grew 40 times, while the country's GDP increased about three-fold. Where does Saakashvili get the cash to rearm his army?

Czech-made 152-mm "Dana" self-propelled howitzers of the Georgian army used in the bombardment of Tskhinvali.

Even if Georgia spent its entire ten-billion-dollar GDP on defense, its army still would not have been a match for the Russian military. Was Saakashvili throwing money to the wind, wasting precious resources of his impoverished nation on a hopeless stand-off with Russia? Not at all. If Georgia was getting ready to fight a war with Russia, its primary spending category would have been air defenses. However, take a closer look at the list of Georgia's weapons acquisitions over the past eight year: there are no signs of any major air defense purchases. Instead, we see lots of mortars, howitzers, tanks, helicopters, and even two landing ships. Georgia was preparing for a war against separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Six Czech-made MR-70 Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems like this one were used by the Georgian army to bombard Tskhinvali, causing more than 2,000 civilian casualties.

So what does Georgia have in terms of air defenses? According to the August 2008 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Georgian air defenses consist of the following: “30 SA-7 Strela-2/2M (Igla) Manportable Surface-to-Air Missile, 5 ZSU-23-4 Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Systems, 12 ZU-23-2 Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 4 100 mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 4 57 mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery.” In other words, Georgia was hardly a threat to the Russian Air Force. Still, Georgia was able to down two Russian aircraft: an Su-25 ground attack jet and the Tu-22M3R reconnaissance plane (a version of the Tu-22M3 supersonic bomber), piloted by Col. Igor Zinov, a 50 year-old Tu-22M3 instructor pilot stationed at the Flight Test Center at Akhtubinsk. The Russians admitted the loss of the two aircraft and said that the Tu-22M3R was shot down by the Georgians using an S-200 (NATO designation: SA-5 Gammon) long-range SAM secretly purchased from Ukraine in late 2007.

The Tu-22M3R is the reconnaissance version of the Tu-22MR supersonic bomber like the one shown in the photos.

The “Georgia Strikes Back With Air Defenses” article in the August 11 issue of Aviation Week cited unnamed US analysts saying that “...the Georgians are probably operating the SA-11 Buk-M1 (low-to-high altitude) and the (low-to-medium altitude) Tor-1M mobile air defense missile systems.” However, neither Buk-M1 not Tor-1M are known to be in Georgia's inventory and it seems that the Aviation Week editors need to check their sources more rigorously. Regardless of the situation with the downed Russian Backfire, it is clear that Georgia did not expect to fight the Russians in any considerable numbers.

What Were They Thinking?

According to the Georgian attack maps, obtained on August 11 by a forward unit of the Russian 4th VDV regiment from a captured high-ranking Georgian staff officer, Tbilisi's plan called for a blitzkrieg invasion of South Ossetia in the early morning of August 8, followed by a three-pronged invasion of Abkhazia on August 11, which was to involve the Georgian army's naval component. This explains Georgia's acquisitions of landing craft, naval helicopters, and high-speed missile boats. Preparations for the war against the breakaway regions, it would seem, have been carried out for years, starting during the administration of Saakashvili's predecessor – the USSR's former Foreign Minister and independent Georgia's second President Eduard Shevarnadze.

It is interesting to note, that, according to the captured plan, a major portion of the Georgian forces involved in South Ossetia was to be redeployed for the August 11 invasion of Abkhazia (at least a day's drive from South Ossetia for heavy vehicles, plus another day would have been needed for combat deployment). Evidently, Georgia's military planners did not anticipate any substantial problems in South Ossetia and fully expected the operation there to be concluded by the end of Saturday, August 9 at the latest.

It is evident that Saakashvili's generals did not expect an overwhelming military response from Russia. The Georgians timed their assault on Tskhinvali – South Ossetia's capital – to coincide with the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. With Putin in Beijing mingling with Western heads of states, perhaps the expectation on the part of Tbilisi was of a more cautious Russian response, at least until the end of Putin's visit to China. However, it would have been extremely naïve for Saakashvili and his to pin all of their hopes on Putin's absence from Moscow and the ability of Bush to contain Putin's reaction. Georgia had to have something more substantial in terms of guarantees of Russia's non-involvement.

Washington's Role

On August 10 Russian news agency RIA Novosti quoted South Ossetian official representative in Moscow Dmitry Medoev saying that there were several Negroes among the Georgian troops killed during the fighting in Tskhinvali, raising speculation in the Russian press that American military or private (Blackwater is known to operate in Georgia) instructors might have been directly involved in combat.

Over the past few years, hundreds of US military instructors were sent to Georgia to train Saakashvili's army. Several senior Pentagon officers were permanently stationed in Tbilisi to coordinate these training activities. According to the captured map of Georgia's planned invasion of Abkhazia, up to two-thirds of the country's entire military force were to be involved in the operation. It is inconceivable that the US military personnel in Georgia was completely unaware of preparations for such a massive operation.

The Americans had to have known that Georgian artillery was preparing to slaughter hundreds of civilians in Tskhinvali. They had to have known about the large-scale movements of Georgian troops and heavy weapons. Even if American troops stationed in Georgia did not directly participate in the actual combat, there is no doubt in my mind that they knew the details of the planned massive operation against the separatists and, most likely, were involved in the planning stage of this war.

Did the Russians Know?

No matter how you look at it, this war was a huge gamble on Saakashvili's part. The headquarters of the Russian North-Caucasus Military District and well over a hundred thousand of Russia's most combat-ready units are located in Vladikavkaz – just a 20-mile drive along the Military-Georgian Road from the Georgian border. Even more Russian forces are stationed in nearby Ingushetia and Chechnya. Several large Russian Air Force bases with dozens of combat-ready aircraft are located within fifteen minutes of flight from Georgia. For Saakashvili – and, by extension, for his masters in Washington – Russian military involvement made a difference between a major geopolitical victory and a humiliating defeat. Whatever the Georgians and the Americans were planning together, they had to be sure that the Russian military was not going to interfere. The most interesting question of this war is what made them think that.

An Mi-24 helicopter gunship of the Russian peacekeeping force in Abkhazia in June 2008. (Source: AP)

Obviously, one way to look at this situation is to acknowledge the obvious – the US military personnel in Georgia knew about the planned actions against South Ossetia and Abkhazia – and to suppose that Saakashvili jumped the gun before all the preparations were completed. While it is possible that Saakashvili took an unauthorized initiative, it is extremely unlikely. Rice's recent trip to Tbilisi and the apparent ease with which she convinced Saakashvili to sign the peace deal that heavily favors Moscow is a good illustration of how well Washington controls the president of Georgia. Therefore, Saakashvili's “Olympic” jump into South Ossetia had to be, if not ordered, then at least strongly encouraged by the White House. We have to conclude that the US had good reasons to believe that the Russians will not get involved; or, at the very least, that they will not have enough time to respond.

This is another good point: timing might have been the key to this operation by Georgia. The situation along the border between Georgia and South Ossetia was never calm. However, during the few weeks leading to Georgia's attack on Tskhinvali there has been an increasing number of Georgian mortar attacks against South Ossetia's territory. Some attacks were quite intense, but none were followed up by ground operations. Any military cadet will tell you that sporadic and seemingly random shelling of your positions by the enemy is a sign of an upcoming attack. The enemy mortars your positions near the front line to identify their locations and to gauge your response tactics and your timing.

The NY Times claims that this is "a Russian soldier in Igoeti". In fact, this is a Georgian soldier and the village of Igoeti is 20 kilometers from Tbilisi and is under Georgian control.

The Russians, obviously, knew about the attacks but did not respond in any obvious military way, other than with the usual diplomatic rhetoric and an occasional incursion of its fighter jets into South Ossetia. Were they being careless or did they already know about the upcoming Georgian invasion of Tskhinvali and were making preparations of their own? Some suggest that Russia's lightning-fast response and the number of forces involved is a sign that its military was ready and waiting. It's a possibility: lack of any visible reaction from the Russians to the mortar and artillery attacks by the Georgians might have convinced Tbilisi and Washington that it was safe to act. On the other hand, Russia already had huge military presence at its bases in Vladikavkaz. These are some of Russia's best troops used regularly in Chechnya.

A few days ago we all had a chance to witness Saakashvili's impressive self-preservation instincts during his PR trip to Gori. His belligerent public speeches aside, Saakashvili is not a man who would risk his political career and his life to go to war, if he was not reasonably assured of victory. My impression is – and this is strictly my personal opinion – that Saakashvili did not jump the gun but launched the invasion of South Ossetia with the express permission from Washington. I also suspect that the Russians knew about the attack in advance. They may not have known the exact timing or the details, but they made sure Russian tanks were fueled and the soldiers had their milk and Wheaties in the morning.

Georgians chose to attack as the Olympic Games opened in China. If I was a Russian commander expecting a Georgian attack in the next few days or weeks, Friday, August 8, would have been marked on my calendar with a big red star. Did any of you wonder why Putin and not Medvedev went to the opening ceremony in Beijing? The Chinese press wrote on August 3 that Putin will be in China to “personally inspire Russian athletes to win gold medals”, as well as to promote the Sochi-2014 Winter Olympics. Perhaps Putin was in Beijing to inspire and promote, or maybe he had good reasons to think that Georgia would invade South Ossetia at the time of the opening ceremony and did not believe Medvedev would be able to handle Bush, Sarkozy, and Co.

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Major Weapons Acquisitions by Georgia
(Source: Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, August 2008)

Type	Manufacturer	Role	Quantity	Origin	First Delivery
122 mm D-30	n/a	Howitzer	30	Czech Republic	2006
152 mm Dana	Tatra	Self-Propelled Howitzer	12	Czech Republic	2006
Mi-24B/P 'Hind'	Mil	Attack Helicopter	6	Ukraine	2005
Mi-8MT 'Hip'	Mil	Helicopter	2	Ukraine	2005
T-72	n/a	Main Battle Tank	16	Ukraine	2005
T-72	n/a	Main Battle Tank	15	Czech Republic	2005
120 mm	n/a	Mortar	25	Czech Republic/Bosnia	2005
BTR-80	n/a	Armoured Personnel Carrier	20	Ukraine	2005
152 mm 2S3M	State Arsenals	Self-Propelled Howitzer	12	Ukraine	2004
BMP-2	Kurgan	Armoured Personnel Carrier	40	Ukraine	2004
Mi-35 'Hind'	Mil	Attack Helicopter	1	Uzbekistan	2004
120 mm	n/a	Mortar	14	Bulgaria	2004
Combattante II Class	Cherbourg	Fast Attack Craft - Missile	1	Greece	2004
Tavor	Israel Military Industries	Assault Rifle	n/a	Israel	2004
Mi-24 'Hind'	Mil	Attack Helicopter	3	Ukraine	2004
Mi-4 'Haze'	Mil	Naval Helicopter	2	Ukraine	2004
122 mm RM-70	ZTS Dubnica	Multiple Rocket System	6	Czech Republic	2003
152 mm Dana	Tatra	Self-Propelled Howitzer	2	Czech Republic	2003
SEM 70	Alcatel SEL AG	Radio Transmitters/Receivers	188	Latvia	2003
n/a	n/a	Small Arms and Ammunition	n/a	Bulgaria	2002
9 mm; 7.62 × 39 mm; 7.62 × 54 mm	n/a	Ammunition	1 million rounds	Czech Republic	2002
Mi-8	Mil	Helicopter	1	US	2002
An-28	Antonov	Transport Aircraft	1	US	2002
Vydra Class	Burgas Shipyard	Landing Craft	2	Bulgaria	2001
UH-1H	Bell	Helicopter	2	Turkey	2001
Point Class	USCG Yard, Curtis Bay	Patrol Craft	2	US	2000
UH-1H	Bell	Helicopter	10	US	2000
T-55AM2	Czech Arsenals	Main Battle Tank	10	Czech Republic	2000
MiG-21UM	Mikoyan	Fighter Trainer	2	n/a	2000
n/a	n/a	Personal Equipment	n/a	US	2000

The Cease-Fire Deal and Life in Tbilisi

Fri, 15 Aug 2008 03:07:10 GMT

Mark Deen and Reed Landberg of Bloomberg have beat me to the punch with their Russia's War With Georgia May Reopen U.S. Rift With Europe. Next time I will have to type faster. If you follow the news from Russia and Georgia, you are probably aware of the extraordinary effort by Nicolas Sarkozy to broker a cease-fire deal. The terms of the agreement heavily favor Moscow, allowing its troops to “implement additional security measures” not just in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but across all of Georgia.

The peace deal quickly gained support from Italy and Germany, while the UK and Poland wanted to see the EU adopt a tougher line against Russia. Condoleezza Rice traveled to Tbilisi to publicly show Washington's support for Saakashvili, while privately trying to persuade the Georgian president to accept the French-brokered peace deal.

Another sticking point of the cease-fire deal is Russia's insistence on excluding any references to Georgia's territorial integrity and instead using words like “sovereignty” and “independence”. Today Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said: “One can forget about any talk about Georgia's territorial integrity because, I believe, it is impossible to persuade South Ossetia and Abkhazia to agree with the logic that they can be forced back into the Georgian state.” While the US reiterated its support for Georgia's territorial integrity, Lavrov's point of view is clearly far more realistic.

South Ossetian refugees heading for safety in Russia.

There is another aspect to the wrangling over Georgia's territorial integrity concept. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are Russia's most important leverage against Georgia. For as long as these two provinces formally remain a part of Georgia, there will be no peace in the country. Georgia will remain in limbo and unable to fulfill its aspirations to join the EU and the NATO. If Georgia suddenly decides “The hell with South Ossetia and Abkhazia – Moscow can have them”, Russia will gain territory but lose leverage. Thus, there is a slight possibility that, after a good tug-of-war with the US in the UN Security Council, Moscow will eventually agree to some form of “territorial integrity” language in the final peace deal. The situation will then return to prewar status-quo and start escalating from there.

In other news, as the fog of war over Tbilisi clears and patriotism subsides, people start asking questions. I was finally able to get through to one of my contacts in Tbilisi to have some first-hand information. Needless to say, he is not particularly happy with my blog and thinks that I am a pig-headed Ukrainian who needs to learn tolerance and expand his geopolitical horizons. He's probably right. In any case, Georgians are starting to question the wisdom and, indeed, the sanity of their president.

Russian armored vehicles near the border between Georgia and South Ossetia.

Patriotism is gradually turning to depression as Tbilisi residents encounter their retreating army and begin to realize that this was not the overwhelming victory over Moscow trumpeted by their president. By nature, Georgians are optimists (albeit melodramatic ones and prone to severe mood swings) and depression quickly gives way to anger. It's not that they are surprised they lost the military action – in the back of their minds most Georgians never seriously expected to defeat Russia – but they are appalled by their army's lackluster performance and by Saakashvili's great display of personal cowardice during his PR trip to Gori.

For many years Saakashvili has been telling his country that the West was firmly behind all his policies. America's humanitarian aid and the EU's good wishes aside, this turned out not to be the case. As they are opening cans of USAF-delivered “Spam”, Georgians can't help but wonder if Saakashvili was the right man for the job. Apparently, Saakashvili himself is growing increasingly wary of things to come. The opposition is waiting for the wave of wartime patriotism to dissipate and preparing a major assault on their fearless leader.

Saakashvili's former brother-in-arms and the country's ex-Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili was once again denied entry into Georgia. Okruashvili and Saakashvili grew apart in 2006. Okruashvili was fired from his post as the defense minister, charged with corruption, arrested, and later released on parole. He accused Saakashvili of trying to assassinate him and flew to France, where he received the status of a political refugee. He was tried in-absentia by a Tbilisi court and sentenced to 11 years in jail.

Georgian army official in charge of investigating cases of disappearing humanitarian aid. He points to a hole under the fence and claims that rats ate all the aid. (For the folks out there with no sense of humor: joke alert).

In a phone conversation with Saakashvili on August 12, Okruashvili asked for a pardon and announced that he was “ready to support the president despite the many disagreements that led to the intense standoff.” The same day, during an anti-war rally in Tbilisi, Saakashvili brought up the conversation with his former defense minister and said “I can forget the insults for patriotism is our higher goal.” Nevertheless, Okruashvili was denied entry to Georgia. The reason for this decision by Saakashvili is quite simple: about a year ago Okruashvili aligned himself with Saakashvili's opposition and was considered by some as a possible presidential candidate. Saakashvili is feeling his public support slipping away and the last thing he needs in Tbilisi is another opposition figurehead.

Other than that, life in Tbilisi is business as usual: gas, electricity and hot water are available only on select days and even then just for a few hours. This has been the case for many months and has nothing to do with the war. Just over a year ago Saakashvili proclaimed that Georgia was no longer reliant on Russian electricity. Apparently, Georgian authorities were able to reduce the country's consumption of electricity by thrusting the country into the dark ages for a few hours every day. Georgia's sad economic state, however, did not stop Saakashvili from spending nearly a billion US dollars every year on rearming and training the country's small army. Money well spent, Misha.

Georgian army walking back home. Rumor has it, Russian helicopter pilots don't look kindly on army trucks heading toward Tbilisi.

By now many of you probably have seen Larry King's interview with Gorbachev and Saakashvili's “rebuttal”. Gorbachev talked about the need for peace and the long history of Russians and Georgians living together in harmony. Saakashvili called Gorbachev Kremlin's PR man, mentioned KGB two dozen times, refused to announce his support for the French-brokered peace deal, and generally made a complete ass of himself. In other words, Saakashvili was being himself.

Finally, some of you may be wondering why Russian armored columns appear to be aimlessly roving around Georgian countryside, confusing the hell out of CNN's Anderson Cooper. Some American political analysts are saying that this is Russia's way to thumb its nose at the US. I am sorry to disappoint them: Georgian army withdrew so quickly that they left behind huge stashes of weapons and ammunition. Left unsecured, these stockpiles will no doubt be looted and used to fuel a civil war in the country. Perhaps this is exactly what the Georgian commanders had in mind when they left all these weapons behind. Saakashvili wants NATO presence, even if limited, in the country and an escalating ethnic conflict is the only way he may get his wish.

Russians in Georgia: Goals and Consequences

Thu, 14 Aug 2008 05:08:26 GMT

The Christian Science Monitor – of all newspapers – published perhaps the most relevant and concise description of what Moscow has achieved so far with its blitzkrieg response to Georgia's sneak-attack on South Ossetia.

"If the Russians stop hostilities now, they will have redrawn the whole strategic situation in the Caucasus, to the detriment of the Americans," says François Heisbourg, special adviser to the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris. "No one will invest in Georgia, in oil pipelines, in new ventures [there] now.... The game is over. In the new version of the Great Game, the Russians can cash in." The scope of the "victory" is substantial: Moscow controls territory and leverage, has incapacitated the Georgian military, denied Tblisi its much-hoped-for NATO status, and put the Georgian leader it despises – Mikheil Saakashvili – into a tough position.

It has issued a symbolic warning to Ukraine's westward leanings, asserted clout in oil and gas pipeline futures, denied Georgia the possibility of reclaiming breakaway provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and affirmed a deeply Russian set of hard-line political values regarding the disputed front lines of the old cold war.

Moreover, by agreeing to halt its military on Tuesday, working with French mediator Nicolas Sarkozy, and only "recommending" that Mr. Saakashvili step down, Moscow is arguing it has reasonably protected its interests and not overthrown a sovereign state.”

(Russia's big Caucasus win, by Robert Marquand and Fred Weir, The Christian Science Monitor, August 14, 2008)

America's response to what the White House called “disproportionate use of force” by Russia for the most part has been limited to attacks on Russia's image. There is a popular but misguided opinion in the US and the EU that the Russians want to be liked by the West. They don't. They want to be respected and they want their opinion to matter.

For nearly a decade Russia has been complying with the West's every demand. Russia withdrew from Cuba and Vietnam; it did little to oppose NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia; it awarded lucrative oil and gas contract to Western energy giants; it offered its political support in dealing with Iran and nuclear non-proliferation. How much respect did all of this earn Russia in the eyes of Washington and Brussels? None. NATO is continuing to expand closer to the Russian borders; Americans dropped the 1972 ABM treaty and are deploying missile defenses in Eastern Europe; neither the US nor the EU paid any attention to Russia's position on Kosovo's independence, which led to the escalation of the situation in South Ossetia.

Widespread destruction in Tskhinvali was the result of an overnight bombardment on August 7 by the Georgian army.

It took them a while, but the Russian leadership has finally realized that brute force is the only language understood by the US and the European Union. The US is not trying to hide its imperialistic tendencies, bombing nations around the globe. And despite modern Europe's civilized facade, the best way to work with the EU is still to speak softly and carry a big stick. In the end, very few in Russia care how loved Russia is in the world, as long as its opinions carry weight and its interests are protected.

Will Russian economy suffer as the result of the scuffle with Georgia? Not a chance. The brutal truth is that the world needs Russia's resources and influence. It's a very simple equation: Russia has what the rest of the world needs and nobody can take it by force. Whether you like them or hate them, you will have to find a common language with the Russians. In the past few months the world gained a better appreciation of the importance of having stable sources of affordable energy. Russia is the biggest such source.

McCain says “kick the Russians out of G8”. He's an old, sick man, and we should excuse his stupidity. Some Western analysts say let's punish Russia by jacking up insurance rates for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. This is not just funny – it's hysterical: America's best response to what it believes to be a Russian aggression against its ally is: “We'll raise your insurance rates!” And Russia will pay the premiums by raising oil and gas prices. Brilliant. Bush decided to cancel a joint naval exercise with Russia. It's not really clear who this punishes more: Russia or the US Navy. In any case, the Russian Navy is doing plenty of exercising in the Black Sea off the coast of Georgia.

Injured Ossetian civilians are recuperating in a makeshift underground hospital in Tskhinvali.

In a big rush to tarnish Russia's image, the West should not forget its bottom line. The US these days is not exactly what one would call an economic powerhouse, thanks to the efforts of its president and the flagships of its banking industry. Pentagon generals are up to their epaulets in Iraqis and Afghanis, having to borrow hundreds of billions from the Chinese and the Russians just to keep fighting for another few months. Today Russia told Washington to choose between a partnership with Russia or the love affair with Saakashvili. Prices at the gas pumps across America and the future of the US economy depend on this choice.

But let's get to the situation on the ground in Georgia. According to an official report by the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Gen. Anatoliy Nagovitsin, Russia's losses between August 7 and August 13 are 74 soldiers dead, 171 wounded, and 19 missing in action. According to Nagovitsin, Georgian soldiers captured by Russian forces will be exchanged for the pilot of the Russian reconnaissance plane downed by Georgian air defenses during the first day of the war.

The disarmament ultimatum issued by the Russian side was accepted by some Georgian army units. According to Gen. Nagovitsin, some 700 firearms have been surrendered as of August 13. On August 11, soldiers from the 4th VDV (paratroopers) regiment captured a high-ranking Georgian staff officer, who had a detailed map of the attack against Abkhazia, planned by the Georgian army. On August 11 Russia airlifted several thousand troops and light armor to Abkhazia to counter the planned Georgian invasion. Abkhazian separatists, supported by Russian aircraft, launched their own attack and forced Georgian troops out of the Kodori region of Abkhazia, used by the Georgian army as a staging area. The Georgian army withdrew from Kodori almost without a fight. According to official reports from Abkhazia, two Georgian and one Abkhazian soldier were killed in the operation.

Russian artillery in South Ossetia shelling Georgian army positions.

Monsieur Sarkozy's heroic peace-making efforts gave Russia considerable freedom to implement “additional security measures” throughout Georgia under the peace agreement. After being told by Sarkozy that the Russian tanks are forty miles away from Tbilisi, Saakashvili agreed to Russia's conditions for a cease-fire. The NY Times ran a good story detailing the French-led peace-negotiating process.

Unnamed senior US administration officials say that since the fighting begun last week, Russia moved between 8,000 and 10,000 troops to Georgia and that now their total strength in Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions is at least 15,000. To me this sounds like a realistic estimate. Just a reminder: Georgia has a professional US-trained army of 32,000.

Russian forces were stationed to the north of Gori to prevent reprisal attacks by the South Ossetian militia against Georgians living in the city. According to the representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense Maj. Gen. Vyacheslav Borisov, these forces have now moved back to Tskhinvali, transferring control of Gori to Georgian police. Small Russian detachments will remain in Gori for two more days to observe the actions of Georgian police. Borisov reported that he toured Gori with Georgian officials and several foreign ambassadors and that the rumors of widespread destruction and looting are not true. Gori still has running water and electricity.

Vehicle recovery and repair units, escorted by armored personnel carriers, are moving around the countryside outside or Gori and Senaki, collecting heavy weapons left behind by the retreating Georgian army. Russian planes and helicopter gunship continue flying combat air patrols, however, there were no new reports of aerial attacks. BBC footage Tskhinvali showed camouflaged Russian “Tunguska” anti-aircraft vehicles.

Russian Finance Ministry announced that it allocated $400 million to be spend by the end of the year on reconstruction of Tskhinvali. Russian gas and electric crews are working around the clock to restore basic services to the city. Electricity, local TV broadcasts and newspaper deliveries are expected to be restored by Friday.

Reuters Published Fake Propaganda Photos

Wed, 13 Aug 2008 16:49:29 GMT

When people read news reports by Reuters, they expect a certain degree of objectivity and professionalism. Too often their expectations remain unfulfilled. The photos below have been floating in the blogosphere for the past few days. They depict the same individuals posing as Georgia soldiers and civilian victims of the “Russian aggression”.

Propaganda is nothing extraordinary in times of war. However, when PR spin doctor get sloppy, their own propaganda tricks turn against them. If the Georgians had to stage scenes of civilian casualties in Gori for the benefit of hapless Western journalists, what does this tell you about the actual extent of civilian casualties in the town?

Below is a Reuters photo of two Georgian soldiers carrying a wounded boy. It is interesting to note that the boy's supposedly injured right leg, “bleeding” profusely from the thigh, seems to be supporting itself. The soldier on the right also appears on many of the photos below in various capacities.

Here is the photo of this “soldier” now in civilian clothing in a different location:

Here is another Reuters shot: the guy from the previous two photos is now dressed in black. Note the “victim” laying face-down on the ground: you will see him again.

In the Reuters photo below we see the “soldier” and the “victim” from the photos above. Reuters reported that the man was grieving for his dead brother. Apparently, before succumbing to grief, he decided to take his shirt off and put on a different pair of pants:

Finally, here is some BBC footage showing the “victim” from the two photos above being carried by Georgian soldiers at an entirely different location. Apparently he is still “alive”. Click on the image to see the video.

The problem with agencies like Reuters is that they use local photographers almost exclusively with little or no background verification. In the recent years there have been many cases of Reuters photographers misrepresenting or doctoring their photos. Apparently, these highly-publicized incidents were not enough to prompt Reuters to improve its quality standards.