I grew a bit tired of LiveJournal and decided to move my blog to a more stable platform. LiveJournal developers managed to produce an interface that combines few useful features with an abundance of bugs. This is a truly remarkable "achievement" for an IT company operating in Russia - the land of quality programming on a budget. And then there is LiveJournal's habit of changing around its interface on a regular basis and for no particular reason. Sort of like the new Microsoft Office...
And so, without further ado, the link to my blog's new location: http://www.venik4.com
During the five-day conflict, the Georgian army has lost dozens of MBTs, APCs, trucks, self-propelled artillery and other vehicles. Georgia also lost most of its Navy and Air Force. Majority of Georgian air defense assets were destroyed. Most of the equipment lost by Georgia was not not destroyed but rather abandoned by the Georgian army during its speedy retreat.
According to the UNOSAT report, at least 438 residential buildings in Tskhinvali were destroyed or seriously damaged. South Ossetian authorities estimate the damage to the country's infrastructure at around USD 400 million. Russia allocated USD 500 million to be spent by the end of the year on reconstruction in South Ossetia. Additional funding for South Ossetia will be allocated in 2009 through the federal budget of North Ossetia.
According to the latest reports, more than 1,900 people have been killed in the August 7-12 attack on South Ossetia by the army of Georgia. Russian prosecutors so far have identified the remains of 134 dead residents of South Ossetia in addition to the 59 killed and 104 wounded Russian peacekeepers.
In the late 1800s, one American poet wrote: “When I see a bird that walks like a duck and swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, I call that bird a duck.” Since the first day of the war in the Caucasus, people familiar with history started noticing peculiar similarities between Georgia's attack on South Ossetia and the 1995 Operation Storm, when the US-trained Croatian army launched what the UN called the biggest ethnic cleansing operation of the Balkan wars against ethnic Serbs in the Krajina region. In 1995 the Pentagon hired Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) – a US-based mercenary firm - to prepare the Croatian army for the operation in Krajina. General Carl E. Vuono – a US general of Finnish ancestry, the former Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command – was hired by MPRI in 1993 and is believed to have been the key planner behind the Operation Storm. Today Carl Vuono is the president of MPRI.
The Financial Times recently published a report (“US military trained Georgian commandos”, by Charles Clover and Demetri Sevastopulo, FT, Sept. 5, 2008) revealing that some time in 2006 the Pentagon contracted MPRI to provide training to Georgian special forces. According to email obtained by the Financial Times, the US instructors in Georgia were paid $2000 per week plus expenses. The existence of this training program was confirmed by the spokesman for the US European Command. MPRI's involvement in Georgia has been suspected for some time and now it has been officially confirmed by the Pentagon.
The reason Pentagon hires these private contractors is not to save money and not because the US military lacks the necessary expertise or resources. The primary goal here is very simple: should the shit hit the fan – like it did in Georgia – all of it would land on MPRI's doorstep. On August 28 Russia's General Nogovitsin showed journalists a US passport found by Russian troops in South Ossetia. The passport belongs to one Michael Lee White, a US Army veteran from Austin, Texas. Mr. White teaches English at the Guangdong University of Business Studies in southern China. In the interview to the WSJ, White claims to have accidentally left the passport in the seat pocket on a flight from Moscow to New York in 2005. However, in another interview White said that the passport was stolen from him ("Local family, global intrigue", by Martey Toohey, Austin American - Statesman, page B1, Aug. 31, 2008). The Russian authorities say that the passport bears entry and exit stamps for the period after 2005. In particular, White's passport shown by Nogovitsin bears a 2008 entry stamp for Kazakhstan. Officials in Kazakhstan confirmed that White has a valid visa there. The same information was confirmed by the Statesman.
The Wall Street Journal reports (“From Russia Without Love: Kremlin Calls Mr. White a U.S. Agent”, by Gordon Fairclough and Gregory L. White, WSJ, Sept. 3, 2008) that Mr. White's new passport shows that he left China on July 18 and returned on August 28 – the day Gen. Nogovitsin made his announcement. Mr White claims that he was in Texas caring for his elderly father, however, his passport does not show US entry or exit stamps. The Russian government spokesman said that further evidence of US involvement in the Georgian war will be released at a later time.
Why carry a US passport in Georgia? Because, should you be captured by the Russians, this passport will make a difference between getting shot in the head and being put on a plane to Moscow and eventually released. See the difference? And, of course, the Russians would not have said a thing if this passport was the only evidence they had. This, along with Putin's CNN interview, was just a teaser designed to make the US more cooperative (or at least less uncooperative) in this critical time for the GOP.
The Financial Times recently published a report (“US military trained Georgian commandos”, by Charles Clover and Demetri Sevastopulo, FT, Sept. 5, 2008) revealing that some time in 2006 the Pentagon contracted MPRI to provide training to Georgian special forces. According to email obtained by the Financial Times, the US instructors in Georgia were paid $2000 per week plus expenses. The existence of this training program was confirmed by the spokesman for the US European Command. MPRI's involvement in Georgia has been suspected for some time and now it has been officially confirmed by the Pentagon.
The reason Pentagon hires these private contractors is not to save money and not because the US military lacks the necessary expertise or resources. The primary goal here is very simple: should the shit hit the fan – like it did in Georgia – all of it would land on MPRI's doorstep. On August 28 Russia's General Nogovitsin showed journalists a US passport found by Russian troops in South Ossetia. The passport belongs to one Michael Lee White, a US Army veteran from Austin, Texas. Mr. White teaches English at the Guangdong University of Business Studies in southern China. In the interview to the WSJ, White claims to have accidentally left the passport in the seat pocket on a flight from Moscow to New York in 2005. However, in another interview White said that the passport was stolen from him ("Local family, global intrigue", by Martey Toohey, Austin American - Statesman, page B1, Aug. 31, 2008). The Russian authorities say that the passport bears entry and exit stamps for the period after 2005. In particular, White's passport shown by Nogovitsin bears a 2008 entry stamp for Kazakhstan. Officials in Kazakhstan confirmed that White has a valid visa there. The same information was confirmed by the Statesman.The Wall Street Journal reports (“From Russia Without Love: Kremlin Calls Mr. White a U.S. Agent”, by Gordon Fairclough and Gregory L. White, WSJ, Sept. 3, 2008) that Mr. White's new passport shows that he left China on July 18 and returned on August 28 – the day Gen. Nogovitsin made his announcement. Mr White claims that he was in Texas caring for his elderly father, however, his passport does not show US entry or exit stamps. The Russian government spokesman said that further evidence of US involvement in the Georgian war will be released at a later time.
The WSJ article quotes Milton Bearden, a former CIA operative, as saying that an intelligence agent “with any intelligence” would not carry his passport with him in the field. Perhaps an intelligence agent wouldn't do that, but Mr. White is no James Bond – probably just a former Army grunt hired by the MPRI like so many unqualified personnel employed by MPRI, Blackwater and others in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand, people who know White say he is intelligent and well-educated. White's father is - Philip L. White - is emeritus professor of history at the University of Texas in Austin. White and his father are writing a book "Nationality in World History". So maybe he is not just an Army grunt.
Why carry a US passport in Georgia? Because, should you be captured by the Russians, this passport will make a difference between getting shot in the head and being put on a plane to Moscow and eventually released. See the difference? And, of course, the Russians would not have said a thing if this passport was the only evidence they had. This, along with Putin's CNN interview, was just a teaser designed to make the US more cooperative (or at least less uncooperative) in this critical time for the GOP.
The constitutional crisis in Ukraine is a direct result of the threats made by the US and the EU against Russia's WTO membership bid. In case Ukraine's political life is not at the top of your list of interests, here is a very brief summary of events from the past week of Ukraine's turbulent political life.
Yushchenko – Ukraine's pro-Western president – accused Julia Timoshenko – Ukraine's cute, hugely popular pro-Western Prime Minister of treason and launched a formal criminal investigation against his right-hand woman and mother-in-law of Sean Carr of Death Valley Screamers. Yushchenko claims that Timoshenko was in bed with the Kremlin and that Russia was going to support Timoshenko in the upcoming 2010 presidential election. Timoshenko, who is also the leader of the BYT – the second largest faction in the Parliament - sided with the Regions Party (led by the pro-Russian former Prime Minister and presidential candidate Yanukovich) to pass - with overwhelming majority – a legislation stripping the president of some of his most important powers.
Timoshenko also called Yushchenko's rule a “dictatorship of stupidity, irresponsibility and chaos”. Yushchenko threatened to dissolve the Parliament and to call for early parliamentary elections, probably hoping that the anti-Russian hysteria raised in the wake of the war in Georgia will allow his nationalist party to get more seats in the parliament at the expense of Yanukovich's Regions Party. And Timoshenko countered by calling for early presidential elections, which she should have no problem winning due to Yushchenko's extremely low approval ratings. Timoshenko is one of the most ruthless and opportunistic politicians in the history of politics. Yushchenko learned the hard way not to put anything in his Prime Minister's pretty little mouth.
All this Brownian motion in Kiev's political circles was caused by Russia's decision to shelve its WTO membership plans in light of continuing opposition from the US and the European Union. So how does this affect Ukraine, you ask? Russia is by far Ukraine's most important trade partner and its biggest energy supplier. Ukraine imports 90% of its oil and most of its natural gas. Despite sharp political disagreements, yearly trade between Russia and Ukraine has grown from about $9 billion in 2000 to nearly $30 billion in 2007. A quarter of Ukraine's exports is going to Russia.
Ukraine is one of the world's largest producers of cast iron and steel. However, many steel production facilities in Ukraine are owned by Russian businesses. Also, most electricity used by Ukraine's steel mills comes from Russia. Ukraine is a large exporter of coal-derived fuel coke, mineral fertilizers and sulfuric acid. Ukraine is also a major producer of grain, sugar, meat and dairy products. Russia is the biggest foreign consumer of these Ukrainian products. Russia's attempts to join the WTO meant pacifying Ukraine's opposition by offering the country favorable trading status.
Now that Russia is getting ready to put its WTO aspirations on ice for a few years, Ukraine may be hit the hardest. Favorable trading status for Ukraine no longer makes economic sense for Russia, which is now more interested in protecting its own steel, chemical, and agricultural industries. For example, growing food prices in Europe increase viability of Russia's own agricultural industry, making it attractive for investors. Trade with Russia also accounts for most of Ukraine's hi-tech exports, without which the country risks becoming Poland-junior in the European economic hierarchy with no hope of serious growth.
With Ukraine's steel production and coal mining industries behind Yanukovich and the country's energy and agricultural sectors behind Timoshenko, the big business in Ukraine prompted the two largest parliamentary factions – Timoshenko's BYT and Yanukovich's Regions Party – to join forces against the country's embattled president, whose stark anti-Russian rhetoric in the past weeks has irked the Kremlin and threatened Ukraine's growing trade with its largest economic partner. While the West is worrying about Russian tanks taking over the Crimean Peninsula, the likely future of political life in Kiev will be shaped by a different kind of a hostile takeover. Yushchenko's latest troubles are signs of how distant Ukraine's president has become from his country's economic reality.
Yushchenko – Ukraine's pro-Western president – accused Julia Timoshenko – Ukraine's cute, hugely popular pro-Western Prime Minister of treason and launched a formal criminal investigation against his right-hand woman and mother-in-law of Sean Carr of Death Valley Screamers. Yushchenko claims that Timoshenko was in bed with the Kremlin and that Russia was going to support Timoshenko in the upcoming 2010 presidential election. Timoshenko, who is also the leader of the BYT – the second largest faction in the Parliament - sided with the Regions Party (led by the pro-Russian former Prime Minister and presidential candidate Yanukovich) to pass - with overwhelming majority – a legislation stripping the president of some of his most important powers.
Timoshenko also called Yushchenko's rule a “dictatorship of stupidity, irresponsibility and chaos”. Yushchenko threatened to dissolve the Parliament and to call for early parliamentary elections, probably hoping that the anti-Russian hysteria raised in the wake of the war in Georgia will allow his nationalist party to get more seats in the parliament at the expense of Yanukovich's Regions Party. And Timoshenko countered by calling for early presidential elections, which she should have no problem winning due to Yushchenko's extremely low approval ratings. Timoshenko is one of the most ruthless and opportunistic politicians in the history of politics. Yushchenko learned the hard way not to put anything in his Prime Minister's pretty little mouth.All this Brownian motion in Kiev's political circles was caused by Russia's decision to shelve its WTO membership plans in light of continuing opposition from the US and the European Union. So how does this affect Ukraine, you ask? Russia is by far Ukraine's most important trade partner and its biggest energy supplier. Ukraine imports 90% of its oil and most of its natural gas. Despite sharp political disagreements, yearly trade between Russia and Ukraine has grown from about $9 billion in 2000 to nearly $30 billion in 2007. A quarter of Ukraine's exports is going to Russia.
Ukraine is one of the world's largest producers of cast iron and steel. However, many steel production facilities in Ukraine are owned by Russian businesses. Also, most electricity used by Ukraine's steel mills comes from Russia. Ukraine is a large exporter of coal-derived fuel coke, mineral fertilizers and sulfuric acid. Ukraine is also a major producer of grain, sugar, meat and dairy products. Russia is the biggest foreign consumer of these Ukrainian products. Russia's attempts to join the WTO meant pacifying Ukraine's opposition by offering the country favorable trading status.
Now that Russia is getting ready to put its WTO aspirations on ice for a few years, Ukraine may be hit the hardest. Favorable trading status for Ukraine no longer makes economic sense for Russia, which is now more interested in protecting its own steel, chemical, and agricultural industries. For example, growing food prices in Europe increase viability of Russia's own agricultural industry, making it attractive for investors. Trade with Russia also accounts for most of Ukraine's hi-tech exports, without which the country risks becoming Poland-junior in the European economic hierarchy with no hope of serious growth.
With Ukraine's steel production and coal mining industries behind Yanukovich and the country's energy and agricultural sectors behind Timoshenko, the big business in Ukraine prompted the two largest parliamentary factions – Timoshenko's BYT and Yanukovich's Regions Party – to join forces against the country's embattled president, whose stark anti-Russian rhetoric in the past weeks has irked the Kremlin and threatened Ukraine's growing trade with its largest economic partner. While the West is worrying about Russian tanks taking over the Crimean Peninsula, the likely future of political life in Kiev will be shaped by a different kind of a hostile takeover. Yushchenko's latest troubles are signs of how distant Ukraine's president has become from his country's economic reality.
As the Georgian Defense Ministry sacked its Army chief and the Deputy Chief of General Staff, lets take a look at what the Georgian army once was, with the help of some American tax dollars. Watching these ridiculous displays of crispy US-made uniforms and Israeli multiple-launch rocket systems atop shiny Mercedes-Benz trucks, Saakashvili couldn't wait to try out his new toys against his archnemesis - the people of Tskhinvali. His innocent dreams of genocide were rudely crushed by some rusty Russian tanks and his army was demolished by a crop-dusting outfit of old Soviet Su-25s from the potato field just over the mountains.
UPDATE:
Some details on the chain of command of the Georgian Armed Forces:
Minister of Defence: David Kezerashvili
First Deputy Minister of Defence: Batu Kutelia
Deputy Minister of Defence: Mamuka Mujiri
Deputy Minister of Defence: Vera Dzneladze
Deputy Minister of Defence: Giorgi Muchaidze
Chief of Joint Staff of the Armed Forces: Brigadier General Zaza Gogava
Deputy Chiefs of General Staff: Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Osepaishvili (dismissed, replaced by Gen-Maj Devi Chankotadze, former artillery chief), Lieutenant-Colonel Giga Tatishvili
Commander of the Land Forces: Lieutenant Colonel Balakhadze Mamia (dismissed, replaced by Maj Merab Agladze)
Commander of the Air Force: Colonel David Nairshvili
Commander of the Navy: Captain Besik Shengelia
Detailed biographies of Georgian command staff can be found on the South Ossetian information site OsInform. It is evident that many top Georgian commanders have very limited military background. For example, Lt. Col. Giga Tatishvili, the second Deputy Chief of General Staff was born in 1974, until 1993 studied economics at the University of Tbilisi but did not graduate. In 1997 he received his Bachelor in Business Administration from the University of Antwerp, Belgium. During 1997-1999 worked in Moscow as a manager at the Sbarro International chain of pizza stores. During 1999-2001 Tatishvili worked as a Georgia consultant at the UN. Military-related education of Tatishvili did not begin until 2005 and was limited to a few specialized courses offered at the Joint Special Operations University at Hurlburt Field, FL. So there you have Georgia's second Deputy Chief of General Staff - expert in selling pizza in Moscow.
UPDATE:
Some details on the chain of command of the Georgian Armed Forces:
Minister of Defence: David Kezerashvili
First Deputy Minister of Defence: Batu Kutelia
Deputy Minister of Defence: Mamuka Mujiri
Deputy Minister of Defence: Vera Dzneladze
Deputy Minister of Defence: Giorgi Muchaidze
Chief of Joint Staff of the Armed Forces: Brigadier General Zaza Gogava
Deputy Chiefs of General Staff: Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Osepaishvili (dismissed, replaced by Gen-Maj Devi Chankotadze, former artillery chief), Lieutenant-Colonel Giga Tatishvili
Commander of the Land Forces: Lieutenant Colonel Balakhadze Mamia (dismissed, replaced by Maj Merab Agladze)
Commander of the Air Force: Colonel David Nairshvili
Commander of the Navy: Captain Besik Shengelia
Detailed biographies of Georgian command staff can be found on the South Ossetian information site OsInform. It is evident that many top Georgian commanders have very limited military background. For example, Lt. Col. Giga Tatishvili, the second Deputy Chief of General Staff was born in 1974, until 1993 studied economics at the University of Tbilisi but did not graduate. In 1997 he received his Bachelor in Business Administration from the University of Antwerp, Belgium. During 1997-1999 worked in Moscow as a manager at the Sbarro International chain of pizza stores. During 1999-2001 Tatishvili worked as a Georgia consultant at the UN. Military-related education of Tatishvili did not begin until 2005 and was limited to a few specialized courses offered at the Joint Special Operations University at Hurlburt Field, FL. So there you have Georgia's second Deputy Chief of General Staff - expert in selling pizza in Moscow.
Human Rights Watch has published a photo of what it claims to be a Russian RBK-250 cluster bomb found in the Georgian village of Ruisi, near the border with South Ossetia. The caption to the photo published by HRW reads:
The moment I saw the photo, it was clear to me that this was not the 7-foot-long RBK-250. Below is a small collection of photos depicting several RBK-250 bombs. Notice the size and shape of the tail section, particularly at the point where the tailcone connects to the tail stabilizers. Also notice the round stabilizer on the tail of the RBK-250. All these characteristic design features are missing on the weapon in the photo published by Human Rights Watch. Take a look at the shape of the tail fins: the fins on the RBK-250 are longer and have a rounded leading corner.
Soviet-/Russian-made RBK-250 cluster bombs
Several types of Russian aviation bombs, including the 7-foot long RBK-250 (first from the right). The photo of a man standing next to a FAB-250 bomb (third from the left in the first photo) should give a sense of scale. As you can see, the RBK-250 bomb is considerably larger than the bomb on the HRW photo.
Cutaway diagram of a Russian RBK-250-275, showing the payload of AO-1SCh bomblets (Source: JEOD, Jane's)
Today someone took care of updating the Wikipedia "Cluster bombs" article with some relevant information about the use of such weapons in Georgia:
UPDATE:
Another blogger has correctly identified the mystery "bomb" in the photo: it is the Israeli-made MK4 LAR 160 cluster rocket used by the GRADLAR MLRS. This is the same weapon used by Israel in the 2006 war against Lebanon, resulting in heavy civilian casualties. In a letter to Human Rights Watch, Georgia's Defense Ministry has officially acknowledged using these weapons against the Russians, but now Georgia is denying its acknowledgment. Typical Saakashvili for you. Available evidence indicates that Georgian artillery used this weapon against Russian armor near the village of Ruisi, but ended up hitting its civilian residents. MLRS primarily use unguided rockets and are notoriously inaccurate. Such weapons are usually employed against large concentrations of enemy armor or personnel. The fact that the Georgians decided to use this weapon near one of their own villages is a sign of utter panic in the face of advancing Russian armor.
"A battery of Israeli-made Gradlar multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) mounted on Actros 3341 Mercedes 6x6 trucks took part in Georgia's Independence Day parade in Tblisi on 20 January. One of the vehicles was armed with 26 single-shot launch tubes for Israeli-designed 45-km range 160 mm rockets, with the remainder carrying box launchers for 40 Soviet-designed 122 mm rockets. Intended to outrange the 122 mm rockets used by Abkhaz separatists, the new MRLs join an armoury of about 16 122 mm BM-21s and a reported eight RM-70 MRLs in Georgian service. Local press accounts emphasised the availability of Israel Military Industries' Trajectory Correction System guided munitions for the 160 mm rocket, but there is no confirmation that this system is in Georgian service." (Source: "Tblisi witnesses Gradlar multiple rocket launchers on parade", by David C. Isby, Jane's Missiles & Rockets, March 3, 2008)
In the original HRW photo you can clearly see chambered tail fins characteristic of tube-launched munitions. When inside the tube, the spring-loaded fins wrap around the rocket's body and unfold when the rocket is ejected from the launcher. When the rocket approaches the target area, its external casing peals away, revealing the rotary drum with cluster submunitions. The person responsible for misidentifying this Israeli rocket as a Russian aviation bomb twice its size is Marc Garlasco, senior military analyst at Human Rights Watch and former intelligence analyst at Pentagon. Back in the days Marc was one of the guy at Pentagon looking for evidence of WMDs in Iraq. I think we identified the source of the problem. The low level of technical expertise and questionable ethics of Human Rights Watch, which is still refusing to admit the mistake and to publish a retraction, will inevitably undermine its mission and raise questions among its supporters.
UPDATE 2:
Some background info on the LAR-160 and related systems:
"ISRAEL MILITARY INDUSTRIES EXPANDS LAR ROCKET-SYSTEM FAMILY
JANE'S INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE REVIEW
DATE: 01-May-1998
EDITION: 1998
VOLUME/ISSUE: 031/005
p 23
Israel Military Industries (IMI) is developing GradLAR, a variant of
its LAR 160mm light artillery rocket system that upgrades existing
Russian-designed Splav BM-21 Grad fire units so that they can
operate either type.
The company is also studying a shipborne derivative known as NavLAR.
In either case, the launcher can fire standard LAR rounds or IMI's
new AccuLAR version, which incorporates a Trajectory Control System
(TCS). The company is also studying long-range artillery rockets
using TCS as an inexpensive alternative to battlefield support
missiles.
TCS remains effective at distances out to 120km (beyond which the
round's apogee is above the height at which aerodynamic trajectory
correction is effective).
IMI is developing GradLAR on behalf of an unspecified export
customer. The upgrade involves modifying existing vehicle mounts so
that they can accept either the standard Grad launcher (which
generally has 40 tubes) or a pair of 13-round LAR pods.
This allows a user to install either type as required, with LAR
providing substantially longer range (45km with its standard payload
of 104 anti-personnel/anti-materiel bomblets) than variants of the
Russian rocket. A new fire-control system can handle both types of
round.
Alternatively, the modular design of the LAR pod (with alternating
rows of two and three tubes each) allows IMI to offer variants with
different numbers of rounds.
The company is collaborating with Elbit on studies of NavLAR, which
could arm vessels with displacements down to about 1,000 tonnes and
is designed to operate in up to sea state 4. The fully stabilized
mount combines technology from systems that Elbit has developed for
the Merkava tank turret, which provide azimuth control and mitigate
shock loading, with the elevation arrangement from the company's
Deseaver naval countermeasures launcher. NavLAR can fire a salvo of
up to 26 rockets from two watertight pods in 50s, and can be
reloaded in less than 15min.
Both GradLAR and NavLAR, in addition to existing systems, can fire
the AccuLAR trajectory-controlled round. IMI, which is additionally
working with Lockheed Martin Vought Systems and other contractors on
installing the TCS in the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS - see
IDR 12/1997, pp43-49), says that it has a large contract from the
Israel Defense Forces for develop and production of the technology.
AccuLAR retains the same maximum range (45km) as the present Mk 4
version of the free-flight round but has a claimed circular error
probable (CEP) that is one-sixth that of the basic rocket, allowing
it to compete with gun artillery in terms of accuracy. The addition
of the TCS adds only 35 per cent to the price yet, according to IMI,
allows a battery to carry out a typical mission with only one-tenth
the number of free-flight rockets that would be required. Also,
accurate control of the dispensing height permits the adoption of a
version of the bomblet containing a self-destruct fuze, without the
risk of premature detonation.
The incorporation of a TCS requires no changes to the rocket motor
or payload bay, or to the launcher. The addition of new processors
and datalink antennas to the standard vehicle-mounted battery
command post (BCP) allows it to repeatedly interrogate the round's
onboard transponder in flight. Processing of the retransmitted
returns enables the ground-based equipment to determine the rocket's
actual position (and hence its distance downrange) compared with the
predicted value.
The forebody accommodates a small gas generator that exhausts
through opposing ports, which alternately open and close under
command from the BCP. These change the impact point by pitching the
nose up or down, using aerodynamic forces (lift) rather than thrust
to alter the trajectory. The BCP continues to measure the rocket's
position, and resets the nose-mounted electronic time fuze, with the
final update occurring only 2-3s before the bomblets are dispensed."
(Source: Jane's Information Group)
"Israel Military Industries Ltd (IMI)
Rocket Systems Division (RSD)
Address
PO Box 1044/6044
IL-47100 Ramat Hasharon
Israel
Tel : (+972 8) 924 26 84
(+972 8) 927 74 47
(+972 8) 927 74 49
Fax : (+972 8) 925 28 96
Key Personnel
Marketing Director: Israel Weinreb
e-mail: iweinreb@imi-israel.com
General Manager RSD and Vice President IMI: Nathan Wechester
Marketing Department: Rhonda Gannon
e-mail: rgannon@imi.israel.com
Activities/Services
Design, development and manufacture of solid rocket weapon systems and components. Products include: rocket launchers, artillery rockets, anti-tank missiles, rocket motors, satellite launchers and fabricated composite materials and pyrotechnics. Comprised of four strategic business units: Rocket Propulsion Business Unit - provides propulsion systems for the Ofeq satellite launcher and the Gabriel anti-ship and Shafir air-to-air missiles. Also develop and produce SDIO Arrow boosters. Rocket Ordnance Business Unit - develop and manufacture Light Artillery Rocket (LAR) systems. It is developing the high-precision LAR system Accular and Shipon, an advanced personal anti-tank guided weapon. Its Trajectory Correcting System (TCS) can be used on all IMI RSD rockets such as the LAR and the GRADLAR and is being implemented on the MLRS for the Israel Defense Forces. This unit has participated in the LAROM upgrade of 122mm multiple rocket launchers in service in Romania. Pyrotechnics Plant - Develop and manufacture infra-red and chaff countermeasures products including pyrotechnic safety systems for the Arrow missile. This unit has designed a countermeasure protection for helicopters. The plant is the national source of igniter systems for infantry and artillery rockets and of safety devices for space launchers, ballistic missiles and the Arrow ABM missile. Technologies Business Unit - Supplies a range of filament-wound autoclaved and moulded products for aerospace and civil markets as well as for incorporation in rocket motors. Products include ballistic protection systems for vehicles and personal ballistic protection vests and inserts. "
(Source: Jane's International Defence Directory, October 4, 2007)
"Georgians look at the remains of a bomb dropped by a Russian aircraft on the village of Ruisi, near South Ossetia, Tuesday, August 12, 2008. Human Rights Watch has identified the weapon as a RBK-250 cluster bomb."
Below is the original screenshot from the HRW Web gallery and here is a link to a digitally enlarged image. (If you have a higher resolution version of this photo, please send it to me.)The moment I saw the photo, it was clear to me that this was not the 7-foot-long RBK-250. Below is a small collection of photos depicting several RBK-250 bombs. Notice the size and shape of the tail section, particularly at the point where the tailcone connects to the tail stabilizers. Also notice the round stabilizer on the tail of the RBK-250. All these characteristic design features are missing on the weapon in the photo published by Human Rights Watch. Take a look at the shape of the tail fins: the fins on the RBK-250 are longer and have a rounded leading corner.
Soviet-/Russian-made RBK-250 cluster bombs
Several types of Russian aviation bombs, including the 7-foot long RBK-250 (first from the right). The photo of a man standing next to a FAB-250 bomb (third from the left in the first photo) should give a sense of scale. As you can see, the RBK-250 bomb is considerably larger than the bomb on the HRW photo.
Cutaway diagram of a Russian RBK-250-275, showing the payload of AO-1SCh bomblets (Source: JEOD, Jane's)
Today someone took care of updating the Wikipedia "Cluster bombs" article with some relevant information about the use of such weapons in Georgia:
"According to Human Rights Watch, the Russian Air Force dropped RBK-250 cluster bombs in populated areas during the war in Georgia, killing at least 11 civilians and injuring dozens: "this is the first known use of cluster munitions since 2006, during Israel’s war with Hezbollah in Lebanon" - the group said.[1] However, according to Ove Dullum, Chief Scientist of the Norwegian defence institute FFI, the photos on the Human Rights Watch web site actually showed bomblets made in Israel, as it was identical to one of the kinds of bomblets used in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict. The claim came in an interview with Sveriges Radio, and was also aired on NRK radio. He told that both HRW as well as the NPA (which upon the rumours about the use of bomblets had launched a protest against Russia), had received this info from him. [2] Human Rights Watch said on September 1 that Georgia had admitted to using cluster bombs during the hostilities in South Ossetia, The Associated Press and AFP reported.[8] “Georgian armed forces have GRADLAR 160 multiple launch rocket system and rockets of MK4 LAR 160 type (with M85 bomblets) with the range of 45 kilometers,” the Georgian MoD said.[9]"
The photo published by HRW is clearly not that of an RBK-250. If you can ID the weapon on the HRW photo, let me know.UPDATE:
Another blogger has correctly identified the mystery "bomb" in the photo: it is the Israeli-made MK4 LAR 160 cluster rocket used by the GRADLAR MLRS. This is the same weapon used by Israel in the 2006 war against Lebanon, resulting in heavy civilian casualties. In a letter to Human Rights Watch, Georgia's Defense Ministry has officially acknowledged using these weapons against the Russians, but now Georgia is denying its acknowledgment. Typical Saakashvili for you. Available evidence indicates that Georgian artillery used this weapon against Russian armor near the village of Ruisi, but ended up hitting its civilian residents. MLRS primarily use unguided rockets and are notoriously inaccurate. Such weapons are usually employed against large concentrations of enemy armor or personnel. The fact that the Georgians decided to use this weapon near one of their own villages is a sign of utter panic in the face of advancing Russian armor.
"A battery of Israeli-made Gradlar multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) mounted on Actros 3341 Mercedes 6x6 trucks took part in Georgia's Independence Day parade in Tblisi on 20 January. One of the vehicles was armed with 26 single-shot launch tubes for Israeli-designed 45-km range 160 mm rockets, with the remainder carrying box launchers for 40 Soviet-designed 122 mm rockets. Intended to outrange the 122 mm rockets used by Abkhaz separatists, the new MRLs join an armoury of about 16 122 mm BM-21s and a reported eight RM-70 MRLs in Georgian service. Local press accounts emphasised the availability of Israel Military Industries' Trajectory Correction System guided munitions for the 160 mm rocket, but there is no confirmation that this system is in Georgian service." (Source: "Tblisi witnesses Gradlar multiple rocket launchers on parade", by David C. Isby, Jane's Missiles & Rockets, March 3, 2008)
In the original HRW photo you can clearly see chambered tail fins characteristic of tube-launched munitions. When inside the tube, the spring-loaded fins wrap around the rocket's body and unfold when the rocket is ejected from the launcher. When the rocket approaches the target area, its external casing peals away, revealing the rotary drum with cluster submunitions. The person responsible for misidentifying this Israeli rocket as a Russian aviation bomb twice its size is Marc Garlasco, senior military analyst at Human Rights Watch and former intelligence analyst at Pentagon. Back in the days Marc was one of the guy at Pentagon looking for evidence of WMDs in Iraq. I think we identified the source of the problem. The low level of technical expertise and questionable ethics of Human Rights Watch, which is still refusing to admit the mistake and to publish a retraction, will inevitably undermine its mission and raise questions among its supporters.
UPDATE 2:
Some background info on the LAR-160 and related systems:
"ISRAEL MILITARY INDUSTRIES EXPANDS LAR ROCKET-SYSTEM FAMILY
JANE'S INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE REVIEW
DATE: 01-May-1998
EDITION: 1998
VOLUME/ISSUE: 031/005
p 23
Israel Military Industries (IMI) is developing GradLAR, a variant of
its LAR 160mm light artillery rocket system that upgrades existing
Russian-designed Splav BM-21 Grad fire units so that they can
operate either type.
The company is also studying a shipborne derivative known as NavLAR.
In either case, the launcher can fire standard LAR rounds or IMI's
new AccuLAR version, which incorporates a Trajectory Control System
(TCS). The company is also studying long-range artillery rockets
using TCS as an inexpensive alternative to battlefield support
missiles.
TCS remains effective at distances out to 120km (beyond which the
round's apogee is above the height at which aerodynamic trajectory
correction is effective).
IMI is developing GradLAR on behalf of an unspecified export
customer. The upgrade involves modifying existing vehicle mounts so
that they can accept either the standard Grad launcher (which
generally has 40 tubes) or a pair of 13-round LAR pods.
This allows a user to install either type as required, with LAR
providing substantially longer range (45km with its standard payload
of 104 anti-personnel/anti-materiel bomblets) than variants of the
Russian rocket. A new fire-control system can handle both types of
round.
Alternatively, the modular design of the LAR pod (with alternating
rows of two and three tubes each) allows IMI to offer variants with
different numbers of rounds.
The company is collaborating with Elbit on studies of NavLAR, which
could arm vessels with displacements down to about 1,000 tonnes and
is designed to operate in up to sea state 4. The fully stabilized
mount combines technology from systems that Elbit has developed for
the Merkava tank turret, which provide azimuth control and mitigate
shock loading, with the elevation arrangement from the company's
Deseaver naval countermeasures launcher. NavLAR can fire a salvo of
up to 26 rockets from two watertight pods in 50s, and can be
reloaded in less than 15min.
Both GradLAR and NavLAR, in addition to existing systems, can fire
the AccuLAR trajectory-controlled round. IMI, which is additionally
working with Lockheed Martin Vought Systems and other contractors on
installing the TCS in the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS - see
IDR 12/1997, pp43-49), says that it has a large contract from the
Israel Defense Forces for develop and production of the technology.
AccuLAR retains the same maximum range (45km) as the present Mk 4
version of the free-flight round but has a claimed circular error
probable (CEP) that is one-sixth that of the basic rocket, allowing
it to compete with gun artillery in terms of accuracy. The addition
of the TCS adds only 35 per cent to the price yet, according to IMI,
allows a battery to carry out a typical mission with only one-tenth
the number of free-flight rockets that would be required. Also,
accurate control of the dispensing height permits the adoption of a
version of the bomblet containing a self-destruct fuze, without the
risk of premature detonation.
The incorporation of a TCS requires no changes to the rocket motor
or payload bay, or to the launcher. The addition of new processors
and datalink antennas to the standard vehicle-mounted battery
command post (BCP) allows it to repeatedly interrogate the round's
onboard transponder in flight. Processing of the retransmitted
returns enables the ground-based equipment to determine the rocket's
actual position (and hence its distance downrange) compared with the
predicted value.
The forebody accommodates a small gas generator that exhausts
through opposing ports, which alternately open and close under
command from the BCP. These change the impact point by pitching the
nose up or down, using aerodynamic forces (lift) rather than thrust
to alter the trajectory. The BCP continues to measure the rocket's
position, and resets the nose-mounted electronic time fuze, with the
final update occurring only 2-3s before the bomblets are dispensed."
(Source: Jane's Information Group)
"Israel Military Industries Ltd (IMI)
Rocket Systems Division (RSD)
Address
PO Box 1044/6044
IL-47100 Ramat Hasharon
Israel
Tel : (+972 8) 924 26 84
(+972 8) 927 74 47
(+972 8) 927 74 49
Fax : (+972 8) 925 28 96
Key Personnel
Marketing Director: Israel Weinreb
e-mail: iweinreb@imi-israel.com
General Manager RSD and Vice President IMI: Nathan Wechester
Marketing Department: Rhonda Gannon
e-mail: rgannon@imi.israel.com
Activities/Services
Design, development and manufacture of solid rocket weapon systems and components. Products include: rocket launchers, artillery rockets, anti-tank missiles, rocket motors, satellite launchers and fabricated composite materials and pyrotechnics. Comprised of four strategic business units: Rocket Propulsion Business Unit - provides propulsion systems for the Ofeq satellite launcher and the Gabriel anti-ship and Shafir air-to-air missiles. Also develop and produce SDIO Arrow boosters. Rocket Ordnance Business Unit - develop and manufacture Light Artillery Rocket (LAR) systems. It is developing the high-precision LAR system Accular and Shipon, an advanced personal anti-tank guided weapon. Its Trajectory Correcting System (TCS) can be used on all IMI RSD rockets such as the LAR and the GRADLAR and is being implemented on the MLRS for the Israel Defense Forces. This unit has participated in the LAROM upgrade of 122mm multiple rocket launchers in service in Romania. Pyrotechnics Plant - Develop and manufacture infra-red and chaff countermeasures products including pyrotechnic safety systems for the Arrow missile. This unit has designed a countermeasure protection for helicopters. The plant is the national source of igniter systems for infantry and artillery rockets and of safety devices for space launchers, ballistic missiles and the Arrow ABM missile. Technologies Business Unit - Supplies a range of filament-wound autoclaved and moulded products for aerospace and civil markets as well as for incorporation in rocket motors. Products include ballistic protection systems for vehicles and personal ballistic protection vests and inserts. "
(Source: Jane's International Defence Directory, October 4, 2007)
As expected, the EU resolution on Russia was all gasconade and bravado. Russia's unspoken threat to restrict energy supplies to the European Union did the trick. Gordon Brown found out that a “root-and-branch” review of relations with Russia may be difficult when you are covered head to toe in Russian oil. Today Russia is supplying nearly 35% of oil and 40% of natural gas consumed by the European Union. The EU is desperate to diversify its natural gas and oil supplies.
The key component in this diversification plan is the proposed Nabucco natural gas pipeline linking Erzurum, Turkey with Central Europe. The Nabucco project will connect with the gas pipeline running from Azerbaijan via unstable Georgia and separatist-infested Turkey. Not exactly the most dependable of arrangements. Just a few weeks ago PKK militants in Turkey blew up the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and threatened more such attacks in the future. Not to mention that the pipeline passes near another unstable, ethnically-distinct and potentially breakaway region of Georgia – Ajaria, which also controls Georgia's largest commercial port in Batumi.
A possible decision by the EU to postpone the EU-Russia summit may force Putin to look for a new place to sleep. (Source: MARKKU ULANDER/AFP/Getty Images, Putin at the 2006 EU-Russia Summit)
For its part, Russia is also seeking to diversify its gas and oil export markets. The key to Russia's plan is the nearly 3,000-mile Eastern Pipeline, linking East Siberia and the Pacific Ocean. The pipeline project, with an estimated cost of $24 billion, has been delayed by one year due to adverse weather conditions and technical problems. Also, because of environmental concerns, the pipeline had to be moved 25 miles north of lake Baikal. After stepping down as Russia's president, Putin took personal charge of the pipeline project, which is currently due to open in late 2009. The pipeline will give Russian oil producers direct access to markets in China, Korea, and Japan, dramatically increasing Russia's leverage over the European Union. In the pipeline war, Russia's vast size is a definite advantage.
On Sunday, ahead of the EU meeting in Brussels, Medvedev announced that Russia's recognition of independence of Georgia's two breakaway regions was irreversible. He also announced that Russia will sign bilateral agreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia to provide these two nations economic, social, humanitarian, and military assistance. The purpose and timing of this announcement were to show the EU that an economic confrontation with Russia was not going to change Russia's policies toward Georgia and its former territories.
So why, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the Europeans and the Americans still lack any kind of useful leverage against Russia? The various complicated reasons boil down to two simple points: political mistrust and economic protectionism that force the West to keep Russian businesses at an arm's length. The US still haven't repealed the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment denying Russia “most favored nation” trading status due to emigration restrictions. Such restrictions in Russia have been lifted in the late 1980s. The result of this pigheaded approach to doing business with Russia is that, when push comes to shove, the West finds itself without means to influence Russian foreign policy, while still dependent on Russian oil and gas.
The key component in this diversification plan is the proposed Nabucco natural gas pipeline linking Erzurum, Turkey with Central Europe. The Nabucco project will connect with the gas pipeline running from Azerbaijan via unstable Georgia and separatist-infested Turkey. Not exactly the most dependable of arrangements. Just a few weeks ago PKK militants in Turkey blew up the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and threatened more such attacks in the future. Not to mention that the pipeline passes near another unstable, ethnically-distinct and potentially breakaway region of Georgia – Ajaria, which also controls Georgia's largest commercial port in Batumi.
A possible decision by the EU to postpone the EU-Russia summit may force Putin to look for a new place to sleep. (Source: MARKKU ULANDER/AFP/Getty Images, Putin at the 2006 EU-Russia Summit)
For its part, Russia is also seeking to diversify its gas and oil export markets. The key to Russia's plan is the nearly 3,000-mile Eastern Pipeline, linking East Siberia and the Pacific Ocean. The pipeline project, with an estimated cost of $24 billion, has been delayed by one year due to adverse weather conditions and technical problems. Also, because of environmental concerns, the pipeline had to be moved 25 miles north of lake Baikal. After stepping down as Russia's president, Putin took personal charge of the pipeline project, which is currently due to open in late 2009. The pipeline will give Russian oil producers direct access to markets in China, Korea, and Japan, dramatically increasing Russia's leverage over the European Union. In the pipeline war, Russia's vast size is a definite advantage.
On Sunday, ahead of the EU meeting in Brussels, Medvedev announced that Russia's recognition of independence of Georgia's two breakaway regions was irreversible. He also announced that Russia will sign bilateral agreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia to provide these two nations economic, social, humanitarian, and military assistance. The purpose and timing of this announcement were to show the EU that an economic confrontation with Russia was not going to change Russia's policies toward Georgia and its former territories.
So why, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the Europeans and the Americans still lack any kind of useful leverage against Russia? The various complicated reasons boil down to two simple points: political mistrust and economic protectionism that force the West to keep Russian businesses at an arm's length. The US still haven't repealed the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment denying Russia “most favored nation” trading status due to emigration restrictions. Such restrictions in Russia have been lifted in the late 1980s. The result of this pigheaded approach to doing business with Russia is that, when push comes to shove, the West finds itself without means to influence Russian foreign policy, while still dependent on Russian oil and gas.
On Monday the EU is expected to announce countermeasures to Russia's recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian diplomatic sources hinted that any practical economic sanctions against Russia may lead to reduced oil supplies to the European Union. And so the question is: does the Brussels have the balls to take on Moscow or will the EU's response be just another diplomatic fart in Russia's general direction.
A senior French diplomatic source was quoted by Reuters as saying that no specific sanctions against Russia will be announced at the EU meeting on Monday. The EU is choosing between two draft resolutions against Russia: the “mild” one prepared by Italy and the “tough” one prepared by the UK and Poland. The Italian version does not call for any specific sanctions – economic or otherwise – against Russia.
Forecasting Russia's political future is as difficult as it is entertaining. My personal opinion is that the EU will choose against sanctions. Following the spike in oil prices earlier this year and mass strikes by truck drivers and fishermen across the European Union, it is difficult to see European leaders wishing to repeat the experience. In the recent weeks Russia showed that it is not all talk. There is no reason to doubt that Russia will make good on its promise to restrict energy supplies to Europe.
Gordon Brown is talking tough, which I find suspicious. Whenever Brown is full of hot air and needs to vent, he starts using colorful language, rich in metaphor but lacking in substance. Like when he threatened a “root and branch” review of relations with Russia or promised urgent action to prevent Britain “sleepwalking” into an energy dependence on Russia. Brown also argues for more funding for the pipeline project to carry Caspian gas to Europe via Turkey.
Unless Britain plans to have the pipeline ready by Monday, my guess is the EU's upcoming resolution will be limited to tough language and unspecified threats against future political cooperation with Russia. Something in Brown's tone and his choice of words tells me that all this bluster is how he covers his ass ahead of tomorrow's toothless resolution. A typical middle manager behavior. And cover his ass he must, for Miliband set us up for the greatest show on Earth, but what's coming is another rerun of “Law and Order”.
A senior French diplomatic source was quoted by Reuters as saying that no specific sanctions against Russia will be announced at the EU meeting on Monday. The EU is choosing between two draft resolutions against Russia: the “mild” one prepared by Italy and the “tough” one prepared by the UK and Poland. The Italian version does not call for any specific sanctions – economic or otherwise – against Russia.
Forecasting Russia's political future is as difficult as it is entertaining. My personal opinion is that the EU will choose against sanctions. Following the spike in oil prices earlier this year and mass strikes by truck drivers and fishermen across the European Union, it is difficult to see European leaders wishing to repeat the experience. In the recent weeks Russia showed that it is not all talk. There is no reason to doubt that Russia will make good on its promise to restrict energy supplies to Europe.Gordon Brown is talking tough, which I find suspicious. Whenever Brown is full of hot air and needs to vent, he starts using colorful language, rich in metaphor but lacking in substance. Like when he threatened a “root and branch” review of relations with Russia or promised urgent action to prevent Britain “sleepwalking” into an energy dependence on Russia. Brown also argues for more funding for the pipeline project to carry Caspian gas to Europe via Turkey.
Unless Britain plans to have the pipeline ready by Monday, my guess is the EU's upcoming resolution will be limited to tough language and unspecified threats against future political cooperation with Russia. Something in Brown's tone and his choice of words tells me that all this bluster is how he covers his ass ahead of tomorrow's toothless resolution. A typical middle manager behavior. And cover his ass he must, for Miliband set us up for the greatest show on Earth, but what's coming is another rerun of “Law and Order”.
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